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Corporate Taxation:
The General Franchise Tax
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Martin Grace 1

CURREN T STRUCTURE
The franchise tax is actually composed of two alternative taxes, one falling
on net income and the other falling on net worth. The net worth statute dates
from 1903 and has not been revised since 1936. Corporations in Ohio must
compute both the tax on a net worth basis and the tax on a net income basis
and pay the higher of the two. In any case the tax paid cannot be less than a
minimum tax of $50. Ohio banks and other depository financial institutions
pay a modified franchise tax only on a net worth basis, but at a higher tax rate.
The franchise tax on financial institutions is discussed in Chapter 11 of this
book. Ohio corporations pay an additional “litter tax” in two tiers, although
the second tier is paid only by “litter stream” companies.
These are some of the most important features of the corporate franchise
tax:
•

Relative importance.

The franchise tax is the third most important
source of tax revenue in the state of Ohio. However, this tax represents
a relatively small share of total general revenues. As shown in Figure
10-1, 1993 revenues from the corporate franchise tax represented 7.7
percent of total revenues. By comparison, in the same year the per
sonal income tax raised 40.7 percent of total revenues and the sales tax
raised 36.3 percent.
511
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Sales and Use
36.3%

Other Revenue
cigarette
2.4%
Other Taxes
4.4%

Public Utility
5.9%

Personal Income
40.7%

Source: Ohio Department of Taxation
FIGURE 10-1. Ohio 1993 general revenues by type as a percentage of total
general revenue.
•

Volatility o f tax revenues.

Tax liabilities from the corporate franchise tax
for the last ten years are presented in Table 10-1. Several things are no
ticeable from this time series. First, although over the past ten yean
the two taxes on net worth (the general net worth franchise tax and the
tax on financial institutions) have had some ups and downs, for the
most part revenues have increased steadily. Some of the variability of
the general net worth tax has been produced by the dual nature of the
tax. In years of economic expansion more firms had higher net in
comes and therefore paid the net income tax rather than the net worth
tax. The time series for the net income tax reflects the volatility of its
tax base (profits) over the business cycle. Revenues from the corporate
net income tax have moved with the business cycle. Profits are by far
the most volatile component of the state’s gross income. Con
sequently, revenues from corporate income taxes are less reliable than
those coming from other taxes, including the personal income tax,
sales tax, and property tax. The instability of the net income tax has im
posed a roller coaster effect on the overall collections from the fran
chise tax, as illustrated in Figure 10-2. The peaks and valleys in tax
collections in Figure 10-2 are quite pronounced, even though they are
expressed in real terms (constant 1987 prices).

TABLE 10-1
Total C orporate Franchise Tax Liability, Tax Years 1983—1993

Liability Before L itter Tax, Surtax and Credits*
Non-Financial Institutions

Liability After L itter Tax, Surt ax and Credits
Non-financial
Institutions

Financial
Institutions

Net W orth
Taxpayers

Net Income
Taxpayers

Total

$11,404,800

$147,735,230

$332,041,840

$491,181,870

$486,431,925

$37,405,560

$523,837,485

1984

3,962,800

152.794,129

392,943.381

549,700,310

526,520,864

98.853,844

625,374,708

1985

3.480,493

144,100,946

522,502,099

670,083,538

661,568,822

98,650,431

760,219,253

1986

3,418,864

156,793,269

539,368,861

699,580,994

695,018.816

93,705.954

788,724,770

1987

2.783,324

172,179,120

490,115,343

665,077,787

630.587,449

104,670,239

735.257.688

1988

3,003,242

168,554,036

542,200,372

713,757,650

666,389,890

109,640,240

776.030,130

1989

2,835,850

163,646.944

598,482,693

764.965.487

722,042,029

130,125,260

852.167,289

1990

3,031,624

182,506.786

537,005,053

722,543,463

684.708,345

142,896,321

827,604,666

1991

3.614,626

202,190,495

444,733,217

650,538,338

609.690,068

147,271,175

756,961,243

1992

3.719,592

224.748,796

385,027,710

613,496,098

580,451.785

157,912,202

738,363.987

1993

2,501.161

228,158,717

401,836,889

632,4%,767

615.784.545

173,074,954

788,859.499

Tax
Year

Minimum ($50)
Taxpayers

1983

Total

Source: Ohio Department of Taxation.
♦Only liability BEFORE litter tax. surtax and credits can be identified by type of tax base (net worth or net income) for nonfinancial institutions. Liability for financial institutions, which pay tax based on net worth only, can only be identified A FI ER
credits.
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Shifting importance of net income and net worth taxes. The net worth tax
component of the franchise tax has played an increasing role in over
all revenues since the late 1980s as documented in Figure 10-3.

Source:
Note:

Years
Ohio Department of Taxation.

Deflator from Economic Report of the President except 1993;
1993 deflator estimated using

Survey o f Current Business.

FIGURE 10-2. Real corporate franchise tax collections (1987 dollars: millions).
too
■ N et Worth H N e t Income

Years

Source:
Note:

Ohio Department of Taxation.

Totals do not add to 100% due to minimum ($50) taxpayers.

FIGURE 10-3. Liability ofN. W. taxpayers vs. N.I. taxpayers as a percentage of
total corporate tax liabilities.

The General Franchise Tax
•

515

Tax payments are concentrated from a small group of taxpayers.
Although the concentration of tax payments by a relatively small group
of taxpayers is common to other taxes, corporate income taxes have
traditionally been more concentrated than other taxes. Ohio’s corpo
rate franchise tax is not an exception to this rule. As shown in Figure
10-4, over 80 percent of the net worth tax in 1993 was paid by 10 per
cent of the taxpayers. The level of concentration was almost as high for
the net income tax. The highest decile of taxpayers paid just a little
under 80 percent of total net income collections (Figure 10-5).

St r u c t u r e

of the

Ta x

Nexus.

The franchise tax is levied on O hio and non-Ohio corporations for
the privilege of doing business in the state. The presumption o f the general
obligation to pay franchise tax in Ohio is established by doing business in

FIGURE 10-4. Net worth tax paid 1993 by net worth deciles.

FIGURE 10-5. Net income tax paid 1993 by net worth deciles.
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Ohio, owning capital or property in the state, or holding a charter authoriz
ing the corporation to do business in Ohio.2
Besides all C corporations, agricultural
cooperatives (Chapter 1729 corporations) and business trusts are also
required to file the franchise tax. An S corporation is not subject to the fran
chise tax unless it functioned as a C corporation for part of the tax year.
Other corporations not subject to the franchise tax include public utilities3
(which are required to pay an excise tax on gross receipts under Chapter
5727 of the O R C ), insurance companies (which pay a premium tax and are
required to file annual reports with the Superintendent of Insurance), and
“dealers in intangibles” (which also pay a separate tax).4
must file the Supplemental Franchise Tax Schedules
for holding companies of insurance companies, public utilities, and financial
institutions, if the holding company owns at least 25 percent of the issued
and outstanding shares of common stock of one or more financial institu
tions, or if the holding company owns at least 80 percent of the issued and
outstanding shares of common stock of one or more public utilities or insur
ance companies.

Scope of the general franchise tax.

Holding companies

C o m p u t a t io n

o f t h e tax

The franchise tax must be computed by all corporations obliged to file a
return on both bases, net income and net worth. The statutes for the fran
chise tax in the O hio Revised Code (O R C ) are often the subject of inter
pretation by the Tax Commissioner’s rulings and opinions, the decisions of
the O hio Board of Tax Appeals, and the Ohio Supreme Court. The main
steps in the computation of corporate franchise tax liability for 1994 are
summarized in Table 10-2.

C o m p u t a t io n
1.

2.

of the

N

et

I n c o m e Ta x

Tax base.

The initial base for the net income tax is federal taxable in
come, before net operating loss deduction and special deductions. Of
course, the amounts reported on the federal tax forms and the Ohio
adjustments to federal taxable income are subject to verification and
audit by the O hio Department of Taxation.

Adjustments to federal taxable income.

Federal taxable income is ad
justed by several additions and deductions. The additions are only for
the valuation limitation on losses from capital (or 1231 assets) and
losses from the sale of Ohio public obligations. The deductions are
more substantial but fairly standard. They include: valuation limitation

The General Franchise Tax
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TABLE 10-2
Computation of Corporation Franchise Liability for 1994
A. Net Income Basis

l. Federal Taxable Income

plus additions
minus deductions (foreign income, dividends, U.S. interest, other)

2. Base Income

minus allocable income everywhere

3. Apponionable Income

times (income) apportionment ratio (4 factors:

property, payroll, double weighted sales)

4. A pportioned Income

plus Ohio allocable Income
minus Ohio NOL

plus Other adjustments (related entity, transfer on corporation)
5. Ohio Taxable Income

times 0.051 for first $50,000 and
0.089 for income over $50,000
6.Ohio Tax on Net Income
B. Net Worth Basis

l.

Total Net Worth

Sum of capital stock (less treasury stock)

plus retained earnings and additional paid-in capital
plus reserves and deferred taxes
2.
Minus Exempted Assets
(including: goodwill, appreciation, and other)
3. Equals Net Value of Stock
total assets and receipts)

times (net worth) apportionment ratio (2 factors:

4. Taxable Net Worth
0.00582

times

C. Final Tax Liability
1. Franchise Tax Due (the largest of)
Net income or net worth basis
2.

plus Tier One and Tier Two Litter Taxes
3. Total Tax Due

minus non-refundable credits (investment in subsidiaries, export sales, qualifying investment)
minus refundable credits (new jobs, qualifying investment) and advanced payments

4. Balance Due (or Overpayment)
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on gains from capital (or 1231 assets), gains from the sale of Ohio pub
lic obligations, dividends received, interest from O hio public obliga
tions, and net interest from United States obligations.5
O hio corporations are allowed to deduct net income from foreign
sources. However, this deduction was amended in 1991 to limit it in
some cases to a percent of the foreign source income. The rationale
was that some of the operating expenses deducted by the corporation
are also attributable to foreign income. In particular, O R C section 78,
foreign dividend gross-up, and O R C section 951 (subpart F) are de
ductible in full. However, foreign dividends of affiliated corporations
that do not transact or hold assets in the U SA can be deducted by 85
percent, and foreign royalties can be deducted by 90 percent. Income
from technical services performed in the United States for a foreign
firm is not at all deductible.
3.

Allocable income. The Ohio corporate franchise tax, as in many other
states, distinguishes between allocable income and apportionable in
come. Allocable income is either entirely included or entirely excluded
from the tax base of the corporate income tax in the state. In the case
of apportionable income, part of the income is included in the base by
using an apportionment formula reflecting how much of the corpora
tion’s business is transacted in the state.
O hio statutes make no distinction between business and nonbusi
ness income in the designation of allocable income. The issue of what
income is allocable versus apportionable has often been the subject of
appeals by taxpayers because allocated income, unlike apportioned in
come, enters the tax base at 100 percent.6 The following types of in
come are fully allocable to the state of Ohio: net rents and royalties
from real property located in the state and from tangible personal
property utilized in the state, capital gains and losses from the sale of
property located in the state, and dividends which are not otherwise
deducted or excluded from net income.7 Also, net patent, franchise,
and copyright royalties and technical assistance fees are allocable to
O hio to the extent that the activity takes place in Ohio, and that they
do not constitute the corporation’s principal source of income.8

4.

Apportionable income and formula.

A large number of corporations
with an obligation to file a corporate franchise tax return in Ohio do
business in other states besides Ohio. This raises the necessity of de
termining what part of the corporation’s net income ought to be taxed
in the state of Ohio. Except for those income items that are considered
directly allocable to O hio or other states, all other income derived by
the corporation is apportioned to the state of Ohio using a conven
tional three factor formula based on property, payroll, and sales, but

The General Franchise Tax
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with the sales factor double-weighted. The composition of the formula
is illustrated in Table 10-3.
5.

6.

Taxable income.

In order to arrive at Ohio taxable income for the cor
poration, the sum of the apportioned income and allocable income
within Ohio is first adjusted by the income or losses of transferor cor
porations and “related entity and related member” from combined re
ports. The second adjustment is for net operating losses.

Net operating losses.

In the calculation of the net income tax, corpora
tions are allowed to take a deduction for net operating losses (NOLS)
realized in past periods. NOLS are allocated and apportioned, inside
and outside Ohio, for the year in which the NOLS have occurred in the
same manner that net income would have been allocated and appor
tioned. N OLS incurred in or after 1982 can be carried forward for 15
consecutive years, starting the year after the N O L occurred.9 There is
no carry back provision.

TABLE 10-3
Net Income Apportionment Formula

Ohio Apportioned m Total Net Corporation
Net Income
Apportionable Income

x

Property

+

Payroll

Sales

+
4’

+

Sales Factors

•Reduced by number o f factors with a denominator of zero.
The factors are computed as follows:

Property Factor
Payroll F a a o r" r .
_
•• •
Sales
Factor
-

Average cost of owned or rented real and tangible
personal property used in business in Ohio
Average cost of such property used everywhere
To,al comPfn3a,ion P°id in 0i" ? Total compensation paid everywhere
Sales in Ohio
Sales everywhere

'Excludes cost of pollution control, coal conversion, solid waste energy conversion, thermal efficiency
improvement, energy conversion facilities, property that generates rental income, property in a qualified facility
in an enterprise zone, and property used exclusively for qualified research in Ohio.
Excludes compensation to certain employees at a qualified facility in an enterprise zone, and compensation to
employees engaged in qualified research in Ohio.
For sales of tangible personal property, sales inside and outside of Ohio are determined by the final destination
of the property sold; other sales are sitused according to where the income-producing activity takes place. Sales
derivedfrom allocable income are not included in this factor.

520

A B L U E P R I N T F O R TAX R E F O R M

One peculiarity of the dual nature of the Ohio franchise tax is that the
carry forward o f losses is of no benefit in the computation of the alternative
net worth tax that corporations may have to pay even in those years in which
they have made positive net income.

C o m p u t a t io n
1.

2.

3.

O

of the

N

et

W

orth

Ta x

Tax base.

The tax base for the net worth tax is computed as the total
book value of the corporation’s capital, surplus, retained earnings, and
reserves. The value of the corporation’s issued and outstanding shares
of stock for the purposes of the net worth tax is based on the book
value kept according to generally accepted accounting principles.10

Exempted assets.. Certain assets are exempt from

the base of the net
worth, including “goodwill,” appreciation, land used in agriculture, re
search facilities, and pollution-and-energy-saving assets after certifica
tion by the Tax Commissioner. Goodwill is the cost in excess of fair
value of the net assets acquired.11 The list of currently exempt assets is
in Box 10-1.

Net worth apportionment formula.

Many of the corporations liable for
the net worth tax in Ohio are also doing business in other states be
sides Ohio. The share of the corporation’s net worth subject to tax in
O hio is determined through the application of an apportionment for
mula which is different from the apportionment formula used for net
income tax purposes. The apportionment formula for net worth is
based on two single weighted factors; property and “business done” in
Ohio. This formula is illustrated in Table 10-4.

ther

Ta x e s

There are two litter taxes levied with the franchise tax. These taxes were
scheduled to expire in 1993 but have been extended through 1995. It is quite
possible that the state legislature will prolong their lives beyond 1995.
All corporations except “litter stream corporations”, financial institu
tions, family farm corporations and those paying the minim um tax of $50,
pay the “ tier one litter tax.” The tax has a cap of $5,00012 and it is computed
as the larger o f the following two bases:
a. Net income basis: the first $50,000 of Ohio taxable income is taxed at
a rate o f 0.11 percent and for taxable income above $50,000 the rate is
0.22 percent.
b. Net worth basis: Net worth taxable value at a rate of 0.014 percent.

The General Franchise Tax

BOX 10-1
Assets Exempt from The Net Worth Tax
Certain valuation reserves;
Taxes due and payable;
Goodwill, appreciation, and abandoned property;
Specified investments in public utilities, insurance companies,
and financial institutions in which the taxpayer has ownership
interests as required by statute (investments and business attrib
uted to these companies are also eliminated in determining the
property and business fractions for apportioning net worth);
Certified O hio pollution control facilities;
Certain facilities designed to convert coal into other fuels or to
desulphurize coal (assets excluded for 30 years);
Certified O hio civil defense structures;
Certified O hio energy conversion, thermal efficiency improve
ment, and solid waste energy conversion facilities;
Voting stock and participation certificates of production credit
associations;
Land in O hio devoted exclusively to agricultural use;
Property within Ohio used exclusively for qualified research;
Qualified improvements to property located in an enterprise
zone.

(ORC 5709.25, 5709.35, 5709.50, 5709.65, 5733.05, and 5915.29)
Reproduced from Department of Taxation Annual Report.

521
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TABLE 10-4
Net Worth Tax Base Formula

Ohio
Taxable
Value

Total Net Worth
minus
Exempted Assets

x

Property

+

Business done factors
2

The factors are computed as follows:

Pro erry Factor

=

Depreciated Value of Ohio Assets*
Book Value of Total Assets

_ .
_ .
Ohio Business done
Business
Factor
«Total Business done

*Excludes value o f pollution control, coal conversion, solid waste energy conversion, thermal efficiency
improvement and energy conversion facilities, goodwill, appreciation, abandoned property, qualified property in
an enterprise zone, and property used exclusively for qualified research.
**Business done for the sale of tangible personal property is determined by the final destination of the goods For
other types of sales business done is determined according to the situs of the sales.

The “ tier two litter tax” applies only to those corporations that manufac
ture or sell litter stream products. These are defined to include all types of
alcoholic beverages, soft drinks, packaging and containers, cigarettes and
other tobacco products, matches, candy and gum.
The “tier two litter tax” is also computed on the larger of the two alter
native bases of net income and net worth. The rates are double those of the
“tier one litter tax”. The only exception is for the first $50,000 of net income,
to which the rate of 0.11 percent is applied. The “tier two litter tax” is
capped at $10,000.

C

r e d it s

First, there is a credit for investment in qualified subsidiaries.13 The ob
jective of this credit is to address the double taxation of net worth at the par
ent and subsidiary levels. The credit is for investment in qualified
subsidiaries when the parent company owns more than 50 percent of the
capital stock of the subsidiary and when during the fiscal year both parent
and subsidiary paid the franchise tax on a net worth basis. The credit equals
the lesser of the following:
• The tax charged on the corporation’s net worth represented by invest
ments in its subsidiaries.

The General Franchise Tax

523

• The amount by which the corporation’s net worth tax exceeds its com
puted (but not paid) net income tax.
• The amount by which the net worth tax of its subsidiaries exceeds the
computed (but not paid) net income tax.
• The credit for investment in qualified subsidiaries is being phased in
over a period of six years starting in 1990, according to the following
schedule:
Tax Year

Percentage

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

25
50
50
50
75
100

Second, there is a credit for qualifying new investment, which has the
objective of reducing the double taxation of real assets under the franchise
and property taxes. Corporations may claim a credit against the franchise tax
liability for the difference between the property tax paid on certain qualify
ing property and the tax that would have been paid had this property been
listed at a lower rate set forth in O R C section 5733.061 (B). The credit
applies to equipment and machinery for manufacturing or refining acquired
after 1978 and not previously owned and credited by other taxpayers. This
credit is not refundable, but when the credit exceeds the tax liability it can
be carried forward for three years provided that the property has not been
sold.14
Third, there is an export sales credit. This applies to corporations that
increase their export sales at the same rate they increase their Ohio proper
ty and/or payroll. The credit can be claimed through the year 2005 and is
computed on the basis of a formula incorporating the incremental changes
in export sales and property and payroll factors.
Fourth, there is a “new jobs credit” which is refundable and calculatcd as
the amount of Ohio income tax that the employer withheld from its employ
ees times the percentage agreed with the Tax Credit Authority. Rehired or
laid-off workers called back to work in a new facility or in the production of
new goods or services qualify for the new jobs credit. This new credit is
administered by the Tax Credit Authority and the Ohio Department of
Development.
Fifth, there is a credit for qualified non-retail corporations locating in
“enterprise zones.” This credit is equal to the amount reimbursed to speci
fied employees for the cost of day care services (up to a maximum of $300

524
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per child) plus the amount reimbursed to specified employees for training
costs (up to a maximum of $1,000 per employee).
In addition to the tax credits discussed above, corpora
tions are eligible for several other tax benefits. Corporations that invest and
create new jobs in certified enterprise zones can receive several tax benefits
from the franchise tax, including an employee training credit, a day care
credit, exclusion of qualifying property and payroll factors for the appor
tionment of the net income tax, and the exemption of qualifying property
from the base of the net worth tax. Furthermore, the net book value of prop
erty within O hio used exclusively for qualified research activities is excluded
from the numerators of the apportionment factors for the net income and
net worth taxes. This property is also treated as exempt in the computation
of the net worth tax base.
At present, the majority of corporations file
a separate entity tax return. However, taxpayer corporations have the option
of using a combined report for the apportionment of their incomes to the
state.15 Combined reports apply only to the net income portion of the fran
chise tax. No similar option exists for the net worth tax.
More specifically, any corporation subject to the franchise tax that direct
ly or indirectly controls over 50 percent of the voting stock of other corpo
ra tio n ^) subject to the franchise tax in Ohio may elect to combine incomes
for the purpose of apportioning income taxes.16 There is no obligation to
include all the eligible corporations in the combined report, and related sub
sidiaries may elect to file a combined report without the inclusion of the par
ent corporation. If related entities are excluded from the combined report,
the Commissioner requires an explanation for the exclusion.17 Once com
bined income filing is selected by a group of corporations, they cannot opt
out without written permission of the Tax Commissioner.18
Finally, the Commissioner may require combined income reporting for a
group of interrelated corporations if it is felt that a combined report is nec
essary to properly reflect income and tax liability. Often such rulings have
been appealed.

Other tax benefits.

Combined income reporting.

D

is t r ib u t io n o f

L i a b il it i e s

The distribution for 1993 of net worth and net income tax payments
among corporations grouped by level of net worth and by economic sector
is presented in Tables 10-5 and 10-6, respectively. In 1993 there were 107,824
filers, of which 84,391 or 78.3 percent were net worth taxpayers, and 23,433
or 21.7 percent were net income taxpayers. The distribution of taxpayers
between the two bases contrasts with the distribution of revenues. The net
worth tax yielded $228 million or 36.2 percent of total franchise tax rev
enues, while the net income component yielded $402 million or 63.8 percent

The General Franchise Tax

525

TABLE 10-5
Reported Tax Liability by Tax Base and Net Worth, 1993

Ta* Liability before litter Ta* and Credits
Net Worth
Net Worth
Payers

Number of
Filers

Net Income
Payers

Number of
Filers

Total
liability

Number
of
Filers
22.445

$< 0

S I.062.274

20.646

$27,576,223

1.799

$28,638,497

0 1

3.457.697

8,885

3.766.570

549

7.224.267

9.434

10.877.777

35.275

21.371.425

12.226

32.249.202

47.501

2 200,000

11.191.797

7.164

14.698.029

3.001

25.889.826

10,165

24.690.9«!

6.178

37.390.834

2.695

62.081.815

8.873

. .500.001 - 5.000,000

*.623.498

1.409

19.049.265

742

27.672.763

2.151

5.000,001 - 20.000.000

20.714.086

2.189

48.876.795

1.134

69.590.881

3.323

20.000.001 - 100.000.000

36.719.759

1.612

67.416.587

852

104.136.346

2.464

100,000.001 - 250,000.000

22.950.564

534

39.480.517

238

62.431.081

772

250.000.001

500.000.000

20,978.333

231

29.403.482

93

50.381.815

324

MX).000.001 - 750.000.000

12.415.001

83

14.669.812

39

27.084.813

122

5.447.423

51

6.142.703

13

11.590.126

64

48,880.774

134

72.188.481

52

121.069.255

186

$228,009,964

84.391

$402,030,723

23.433

$630,040,687

107.824

.'00,001

500.000

S00.001 - 2,500.000

750.000.001 - 1.000.000.000
> 1.000.000.000
TOTAL

Litter Taxes, Credits, and Total Reported Liability
Net Worth
Tier 1 *
Litter Tax

Tier 2*
litter Tax

New Investment
Credit

Subsidiary &
Other
Credits

Total Liability

$< 0

$304,121

$24,927

$6,002,070

$144,623

0- 1

66.541

748

103.825

11.064

7,176.667

601.314

17.452

331.145

93.381

32.443.442

2 - 200.000
200.001 • 500.000
500.001 - 2.500.000

$22,820,852

606.341

16.298

687.464

53.085

25.771.916

1.390.911

34.720

1.623.866

191.556

61,692.024

629.889

13.784

1.195.312

131.125

26.989.999

5.000.001 - 20.000.000

1.400.574

50.968

2.135.724

776.761

68.129.938

20.000.001 - 100.000.000

2.500.001 - 5.000.000

1.676.883

56.917

3.547.254

1.167.769

101.155.123

100.000.001 - 250.000,000

818.486

35.961

3.790.020

698.033

58.797.475

250.000.001 -500.000.000

487.287

12.599

3.118.471

924.131

46.839,099

500.000.001 - 750.000.000

237.755

16.821

1.096.816

454.446

25.788.127

'50.000.001 - 1.000.000.000

138.212

7.205

283.147

219.369

11.233.027

536.361

35.652

7.017.896

2.487.910

112.135.462

$324,052

$30,933,010

$7,353,253

$600,973,151

> 1.000.000.000
TOTAL

$8,894,675

* Tier 1 Litter Tax is paid by all corporations

Tier 2 Litter Tax is paid only by ’litter stream* corporations.

of total revenues. Litter taxes raised $9.2 million in 1993. Total credits
allowed against the franchise tax in 1993 amounted to $38.3 million, of
which $30.9 million corresponded to the new investment tax credit.
The distribution of tax liabilities among different firm sizes and econom
ic groups is better visualized in percentage terms. This is shown in Tables 10-
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TABLE 10-6
Reported Tax Liability by Tax Base and Industry, 1993

Tax Liability before Litter Tax and Credits
Industry

Net Worth
Payers

Number
of Filers

Net Income
Payers

Number
of Filers

Total
Liability

Number
of Filen

S I.216.809

1.146

S I.669.607

380

S2.886.416

Mining

8.857.777

1.014

3.637.913

173

12.495.690

1.1*7

Construction

7.271.866

7.483

14.951.878

2.165

22.223.744

9.648

Manufacturing

84.341.330

10.431

204.172.971

4.025

288.514.301

14.456

Utilities

21.912.296

3.369

28.796.966

1.019

50.709.262

4.388

Wholesale

17.754.276

6.446

32.419.816

2.318

50.174.092

8.764

R euil

20.527.571

11.125

46.673.693

3.391

67.201.264

14.516

Agriculture. Forestry

1.526

Finance. Insurance. & Real Estate

31.698.024

9.824

23.424.360

2.470

55.122.384

12.294

Services

22.951.030

23.498

37.946.724

5.787

60.897.754

29.285

Not Classified
TOTAL

11.478.985

10.055

8.336.795

1.705

19.815.780

11.760

S228.009.964

84.391

S402.030.723

23.433

S630.040.687

107.824

Litter Taxes. Credits, and Total Reported Liability
Industry
Tier I *
Litter Tax

Tier 2*
Litter Tax

New
Investment
Credit

Subsidiary &
Other Credits

Total Liabilit>

Agriculture. Forestry

S52.418

S336

S8.021

Si .246

Mining

183.965

860

643.064

105.441

11.932.010

Construction

464.970

5.864

82.770

50.758

22.561,050
261.207.949

$2,929,903

3.678.054

129.536

27.366.195

3.747.747

Utilities

463.486

267

90.612

679.397

50.403.007

Wholesale

913.495

54.012

621.463

560.919

49.959.215

Retail

943.665

106.152

282.134

177.755

67.791.192

Finance. Insurance. Sl Real Estate

820.690

7.683

175.027

1.257.108

54.518.623

1.135.244

13.317

131.323

563.403

61.351.590

Manufacturing

Services
Not Classified
TOTAL

238.688

6.025

1.532,401

209,479

18.318.612

S8.894.675

S324.052

S30.933.010

S7.353.253

S600.973.I51

* Tier 1 Utter Tax is paid by all corporations. Tier 2 Litter Tax is paid only by 'litter stream* corporations.

7 and 10-8. Smaller firms with a net worth under $500,000 represented 73.6
percent of all taxpayers, but paid only 10.8 percent of all tax liabilities. Firms
with net assets over $1 billion represented only 0.17 percent of the total num
ber of filers, but they accounted for 19.22 percent of all liabilities. Credits also
tend to be concentrated at the top. Firms with assets over $1 billion claimed
22.7 percent of new investment tax credits and 33.8 percent of all other tax
credits. In terms of economic sectors, the manufacturing sector is the largest
taxpayer, being responsible for 45.8 percent of total tax liabilities even though
this sector represents only 13.4 percent of the total number of filers.
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TABLE 10-7
Reported Tax Liability by Tax Base and Net Worth
by Percentage of Total, 1993

T m Liability before Litter Tax and Credits
Net Worth

Net W orth
Pavers

Number of
Filers

Net Income
Payers

Number of
Filers

Total
Liability

Number of
Filers

S< 0

0 47%

24.46%

6.86%

7.68%

4 55%

0- 1

1.52

10.53

0.94

2.34

1.15

875

2 -200.000

4.77

41 80

5.32

52 17

5.12

44 05

20.82%

4 91

8 49

3 66

12.81

4 11

9 43

10 83

7.32

9.30

11.50

9 85

8 23

2.500.001 ■5.000.000

3.78

1.67

4.74

3.17

4 39

1.99

5.000.001 - 20.000.000

908

2.59

12.16

4 84

11.05

308
2.29

200.001 - 500.000
500.001 - 2.500.000

20.000.001 - 100.000.000

16.10

1.91

16.77

3 64

16.53

100.000.001 -250.000.000

10.07

063

9.82

1.02

9 91

0.72

250.000.001 - 500.000.000

9.20

0.27

7.31

0.40

8 00

0 30

500.000.001 - 750.000.000

5.44

0.10

3.65

0.17

4.30

0.11

006

1 84

0 06

750.000.001 - 1.000.000.000
> 1.000.000.000
TOTAL

2.39

006

1.53

21.44

0.16

17.96

0.22

19.22

0 17

100.00

100.00

100.00

100 00

100.00

100.00

Litter Taxes, Credits, and Total Reported Liability
Net Worth

Tier 1 *
Litter Tax

Tier 2*
Litter Tax

New
Investment
Credit
19.40%

Subsidiary &
Other
Credits
1.97%

Total
Liability

3.80%

S< 0

3.42%

7 69%

0- 1

0.75

023

0.34

0.15

1 19

2 200.000

6.76

5.39

1.07

1.27

5.40

200.001 • 500.000
500.001 - 2.500.000

6.82

5.03

2.22

.72

4 29

15.64

10.71

5.25

2.61

10.27

2.500.001 ■5.000.000

7.08

4.25

3.86

1.78

4.49

5.000.001 - 20.000.000

15.75

15.73

6.90

10.56

11.34

20.000.001 - 100.000.000

18.85

17.56

11.47

15.88

16.83

100.000.001 - 250.000.000

9.20

11.10

12.25

9.49

9.78

250.000.001 - 500.000.000

5.48

3 89

10.08

12.57

7.79

500.000.001 - 750.000.000

2.67

5.19

3.55

6.18

4.29

750.000.001 - 1.000.000.000

1.55

2.22

0.92

2.98

1.87

> 1,000.000.000

6.03

11 00

22.69

33.83

1866

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100 00

TOTAL

' Tier 1 Li tier Ta* is paid by all corporations

Tier 2 Utter Tax ii paid only by 'Inter stream’ corporations
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TABLE 10-8
Reported Tax Liability by Tax Base and Industry
by Percentage of Total, 1993

Tax Liability before L iner Tax and Credits
Industry
Net W orth
Pavers

Number of
Filers

Net
Income
Pavers

Number
of
Filers

Total
Liability

Number of
Filers

Agriculture. Forestry

0.53%

1.36%

0.42%

1.62%

0 46%

Mining

3.88

1.20

0.90

0.74

1.98

Construction
Manufacturing
Utilities

1.42*
10

3.19

8.87

3.72

9 24

3.53

895

36 99

12.36

50.79

17.18

45.79

1341

9 61

3.99

7.16

4.35

8 05

4.07

Wholesale

7.79

7.64

8 06

9 89

7.96

8 13

Retail

9 00

13.18

11.61

14.47

1067

1346

Finance. Insurance. St Real Estate

13.90

11.64

5.83

10.54

8.75

11.40

Services

10.07

27.84

9 44

24.70

9.67

27 16

Not Classified
TOTAL

5 03

11.91

2.07

7.28

3.15

1091

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

10000

Litter Taxes, Credits, and Total Reported Liability

Tier 2*
Litter Tax

New
Investment
Credit

Subsidiary St
Other
Credits

Industry
Tier I *
Litter Tax

Total Liability
0 49%

Agriculture. Forestry

0.59%

0.10%

0.03%

0 02%

Mining

2.07

0.27

208

1.43

1.99

Construction

5.23

181

0.27

0.69

3.75

41 35

39 97

88 47

50.97

43.46

5.21

008

0.29

9.24

8 39

Wholesale

10.27

1667

2.01

7.63

8 31

Retail

10.61

32.76

0.91

2.42

11 28

9.23

2.37

0.57

17.10

9.07

12.76

4.11

0.42

7.66

10.21

Manufacturing
Utilities

Finance. Insurance. St Real Estate
Services
Not Classi Tied
TOTAL

2.68

1 86

495

2.85

3.05

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

* Tier 1 Litter Tax is paid by all corporations. Tier 2 Liner Tax is paid only by ’ litter stream* corporations

COM PARISON W ITH OTHER STATES
R

evenue

Perform ance

Average reliance on the tax.

By comparison to other states, O hio’s use of
the corporate income tax is below average. This is shown with data for 1991
in Figure 10-6 where O h io’s corporate tax collections as a percent of total
tax revenue are compared to those of the eight top industrial states and to
the entire United States’ average. The comparison with states in the
Midwest Region gives similar results (Figure 10-7). In 1991 Ohio was rely-

1

i
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OH

Avg.

CA

IL

IN

Ml

N.J.

Source: Facts & Figures on Government Finances,

N.Y.

N.C.

PA
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U.S.

1993

Avg. = Average for the Top Industrial States
U.S. = Average for all States

FIGURE 10-6. 1991 Corporate lax collections as a percentage of total tax rev
enue: top industrial states.

OH

Source:

Avg.

IL

IN

IA

KY

Ml

MN

MO

Wl

U.S.

Tax Foundation, (1994).

Avg. = Average for the Top Industrial States
U .S. = Average for all States

FIGURE 10-7. 1991 corporate tax collections as a percentage of total revenue:
Midwest region.
ing less on corporate franchise taxes than all other states in the two groups
except for Indiana and Missouri.
A different way to compare the performance of O hio’s franchise tax visa-vis the average performance for other states is to examine its relative per
formance or tax effort. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations (A C IR ) conducts periodic studies of the tax effort of the states.1'
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Tax effort is defined by the ratio of the hypothetical amount of tax revenue
that would have been collected had the state used a “representative tax
system” to the actual collections in the state.20 If a state actually collects
more under its own tax law than would be collected if the “representative tax
system” were in place, then the state has a higher than average tax effort.
Similarly, if the state’s actual tax collections are less than those raised by the
hypothetical representative tax, then the state’s tax effort is lower than the
average.
Using this approach to examine Ohio’s corporate franchise tax perfor
mance, we find that Ohio has made a lower tax effort on the corporate in
come— net worth tax than the average state in the United States in the period
1982-1991. In particular, Ohio has had a lower tax effort than any other of the
ten top industrial states with the exception of Indiana (Figure 10-8).
These findings raise a number of intriguing questions for which we have
no ready answers. The lower than average performance of the franchise tax
in O hio is unexpected for several reasons. The corporate franchise net in
come tax in O hio has, as we see below, a base similar to that in most other
states, and the tax rate for nominal net income is among the highest. In ad
dition, the O hio franchise tax has a net worth alternative base which is sub
stituted for the net income tax when its computation shows a higher liability.
Practically no other state has this significant lower floor mechanism to en
sure some amount of revenue.
Two explanations are possible for this puzzle. The first is that Ohio is
more generous than most other states in granting credits and other tax ben
efits. Some evidence is presented in this and other chapters of the book that
O hio is more generous than the average state in this respect. The second is
that tax avoidance and evasion are considerably worse in Ohio than in other
states. However, no data are available to pursue this conjecture.

|•

1982

# 1 9 8 6 4 1 9 8 8 * 1 9 9 l|
0

i

u

#

I ...t

♦

•

★

11

•
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MI

NC

NJ

NY

FIGURE 10-8. Relative tax effort for the corporate franchise tax.
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The trend toward decreasing importance of the corporate income tax.

The
ups and downs in the revenues from O hio’s franchise tax from 1983 to 1993
(Table 10-1 and Figure 10-2), and the general decrease in importance of the
corporate franchise tax in total tax revenues, mirror the experience of all
other states in the same period. This is clearly shown in Figure 10- 9, where
the real (at 1987 prices) corporate franchise tax collections for Ohio are
compared to the total collections from the corporate income tax for all
states.21
This pattern of similar behavior in Ohio and the United States is also
shown in Figure 10-10 which tracks the percent change from year to year for
both series. However, these two figures also suggest a less pronounced pro
file in the ups and downs of collections for Ohio than for all states. This is
most likely due to the dual nature of O h io ’s franchise tax, which makes firms
pay the highest of the net income tax and the net worth tax components.
The franchise tax has declined in relative importance as a source of rev
enue over the last ten years. This trend has persisted whether revenues from
the net worth tax on financial institutions are included or excluded from the
total (Table 10-9). W hat are the explanations for the declining importance
of O hio’s franchise tax in total revenues? To answer this we will need to ex
amine causes for the decline in revenues that have been outside the control
of the state, or, differently put, causes for the decline in revenues that are
shared with other states. O hio’s experience with a continuing decrease in the
importance of the corporate franchise tax does not differ much from that of
other states with a corporate income tax, or indeed from the experience of
the corporate income tax at the federal level.

>
cn

I

Years

Source: Ohio Department of Taxation.
Note: Deflator from Economic Report of the President.

FIGURE 10-9. Real corporate franchise tax collections for Ohio vs. all states
(1987 dollars: Ohio in Millions, Total for all states in billions).
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Source: Ohio Department of Taxation Facts and Tax Foundation, (1994)
FIGURE 10-10. Percent change in actual corporate tax revenues (Ohio vs.
total for all states).
At the federal level, collections from the corporate income tax have been
declining since the 1960s, when the corporate income tax represented as
much as one-fifth of total federal tax revenues. Since the mid-1980s and dur
ing the 1990s, corporate income tax collections have represented approxi
mately one-tenth of total federal tax revenues. A part of this decline is
associated with policy changes granting more favorable tax treatment to cor
porations, which started with the investment tax credits of the 1960s and
culminated with the Accelerated Cost Recovery Act of 1981. The Tax
Reform Act (T R A ) of 1986 was in part an attempt to turn around the de
clining revenues from the corporate income tax by taking away many of the
tax advantages granted in the past and reducing capital depreciation al
lowances, and by introducing an alternative minimum tax.
However, there were offsetting changes in the tax environment after
1986. Perhaps the most important was the number of corporations that
elected to organize as S corporations after the 1986 T RA. The relative
growth in the number of S corporations is commonly identified as a signifi
cant source of erosion in corporate tax revenues.
The main reason for electing to organize as S corporations is a favorable
tax treatment. Federal law treats S corporations similarly to partnerships.
Many states, including Ohio, do the same. The profits (or losses) of S cor
porations are passed through to shareholders, and taxes are paid only at the
personal level. In contrast, profits from C corporations are taxed once at the
company level and taxed again as dividend income or as capital gains at the
individual level.22 The growth in importance of S corporations is dramatized
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TABLE 10-9
Corporate Franchise Tax Liability as a Percentage of State Tax Revenue

Liability After Litter Tax,
Surtax and Credits
Excluding Financial
Institutions

Total

1983

8.4912

9.1441

1984

7.9320

9.4213

1985

9.0797

10.4366

1986

9.1934

10.4329

1987

7.7637

9.0524

1988

7.7565

9.0327

1989

8.2534

9.7408

1990

7.5291

9.1004

1991

6.6936

8.3104

1992

6.1629

7.8395

1993

6.1454

7 8726

Tax Year

Source: Ohio Department of Taxation.
by the fact that in 1986 they represented 21 percent of all corporations and
by 1990 they represented 48 percent. The largest increase happened just
after T R A 1986 was enacted. However, these numbers may exaggerate the
importance of S corporations. In terms of net income S corporations repre
sented only 9.3 percent of total corporate income in 1990; this was up from
5.9 percent in 1986. In terms of total assets, S corporations arc even less im 
portant. In 1990 they represented 4. 1 percent of total assets in the corpo
rate sector, up from 1.8 percent in 1986. One reason for this smaller share
of income and assets is that S corporations tend to be smaller and in the ser
vice sector (32 percent in 1990).23 However, not all of the decrease in rev
enues from corporate income taxes can be traced to changes in tax policies.
It appears that there has also been a persistent downward trend in the rela
tive importance of the base of the corporate income tax. Auerbach and
Poterba,24 who have studied the decline in federal corporate income tax rev
enues, find that while the average rate of corporate taxation had fallen by
one-third from the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s, in the same period corporate
profitability had declined by a factor of two. While it has been relatively easy
to disentangle the causes behind lower average corporate tax rates, to date
there is no clear understanding of why corporate profitability has decreased
by so much. The profit rate has trended downward since the 1960s and
dropped most sharply in the 1980s.25 Many observers associate this sharp
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decrease with the oil crisis that hit at about the same time. The taxable in
come of many corporations has also decreased through leverage buy-outs
and other means for relying more heavily on debt financing. In more recent
years the rate of profitability has turned around, but it has not reached the
levels of the 1960s or 1970s.

How D

i f f e r e n t is

O

h i o ’s

Nexus.

F r a n c h is e Ta x ?

The legal definition and the administrative enforcement of nexus
in O hio are broad by national standards. The state of O hio is more likely to
consider that nexus exists as a result of non-universal business activities,
such as the use of a company car for a salesperson or the listing of the com
pany in the phone book in another state. O f the seven non-universal activi
ties used by state tax administrations to determine nexus listed in Tabic
10-10, O hio is the only state that uses all of them. In particular, Ohio is one
of only four states that considers the presence of a salesperson who only
takes orders as evidence of business nexus.26 O hio’s Department of Taxation
maintains several permanent offices in other states which help enforce the
state’s franchise tax.
Ohio uses a three factor, double-weight sales
formula for the apportionment of net income. The more common appor
tionment formula is a three-factor formula with sales, payroll, and property
having the same weights.27 However, ten other states besides Ohio use the
double-weighted sales factor formula. The formulas used in a selected sam
ple of states are surveyed in Table 10-11. The accompanying Table 10-12
summarizes the nature of the modified formulas of all the states not using
the straight three factor equally weighted formula. Besides the double
weighting of the sales factor, almost every other modification of the formula
also involves some other weighting of the sales factor. Three states (Iowa,
Texas, and Nebraska) use a single-factor sales formula.
O hio conforms with the practice of many other states by eliminating a
factor if its denominator is zero but leaving the factor in the formula if the
numerator is zero (See Table 10-11). Ohio also allows corporations, under
some particular circumstances, to use separate accounting rather than the
apportionment formula as a method of apportioning income to the state. "
As seen in the interstate comparisons in Table 10-11 separate accounting as
an apportionment method is often completely excluded.
O h io does not use a “throwback” rule for the computa
tion of the sales factor of the apportionment formula for the net income tax.
Thus, when corporations doing business in Ohio make sales in states with
out a corporate income tax, those (untaxed) sales enter the denominator of
the formula (hence some sales are not apportioned to any state). The problem
with this approach is that it opens an avenue for tax avoidance by “transfer
ring” sales to the no-tax state. The use of the “throwback” rule would make

Apportionment formulas.

Throwback rule.
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TABLE 10-10
Non-Universal Activities Used to Determine Nexus

Company
Listed in
Phonebook

Company
Car for
Salesperson

Salesperson
Sets up
Promotional
Items

Salesperson
Takes
Orders Onlv

Inventory
Inspection by
Sal**p e r m

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Suie

Licensing
Intangible
Rights

Ohio

X

Illinois

X

Indiana

X

N/R

low»

X

Kentucky

X

Michigan

Licensing
of
Software

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

N/R

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Minnesota

X

X

Missouri

X

N/R

X

N/R

X

X

Sew Jersey

X

N/R

New York

X

X

X

X

Wisconsin
California
Colorado
Florida

X

Georgia

Total of All Other
States
Total of All States
I'sini Activity

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

N/R

North Carolina
Pennsylvania

X

X

X
20

12

4

6

16

2

17

32

18

9

11

26

4

27

Source: 1993 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide
X These items create nexus
N/R • No report from this state.

such sales part of the numerator of the sales factor for Ohio purposes. Table
10-13 surveys the use of the “throwback” rule in a selected group of states.
O hio couples the state franchise net income tax with federal tax
able income before the net operating loss deduction and special deduc
tions.29 About half of the states choose to couple their corporate income tax
bases with federal taxable income, before special deductions; the other half
couple with federal taxable income after special deductions. See Table 10-14
for a sample of state practices. Nevertheless, Ohio allows an adjustment de
duction from taxable income for dividends received and also allows a re
duction for net operating losses in Ohio.
Ohio allows interest from United States Government securities as a de
duction from taxable income. However, some states do tax this interest in
come, as shown in Table 10-15. But in order to tax interest from federal
securities these states must also tax interest from their own state securities.
This non-discriminatory clause makes the option of taxing federal income

Tax base.

536

A B L U E P R I N T F O R TAX R E F O R M

TABLE 10-11
General Formula Apportionment

Generally Used Factors

Stale

Does State
Follow
UDITPA?

Sales

Property

Ohio

Does State Eliminate Factor if

Payroll

Are the
Factors
Weighted
Equally?

Does State
Allow
Separate
Accounting?

Denominator
is
Zero?

Numerator is
Zero?
No

No

X

X

X

No*

Yes*

Yes

Illinois

Yes*

X

X

X

No*

Yes*

Yes

No

Indiana

No

X

X

X

Yes

Yes*

Yes

No
N/A

No

X

_

_

N/A

Yes*

N/A

Kentucky

Yes*

X

X

X

No*

No

Yes

No

Michigan

Yes*

X

X

X

No*

Yes*

Yes

No
No

Iowa

Minnesota

No*

X

X

X

No*

No

Yes

Missouri

Yes*

X

X

X

Yes

Yes*

Yes

No

Wisconsin

Yes*

X

X

X

No*

Yes*

Yes

No

California

Yes*

X

X

X

Yes*

Yes*

Yes*

No

Colorado

Yes*

X*

_

X

Yes

Yes*

No

No

Rorida

No*

X

X

X

No*

No

Yes

No

Georgia

No*

X

X

X

Yes

Yes*

Yes

No

New Jersey

No

X

X

X

Yes

No

Yes

No

New York

No

X

X

X

No*

No*

Yes

No*

North
Carolina

Yes*

X

X

X

No*

No

Yes

No

Pennsylvania

Yet*

X

X

X

Yes

Ye»*

Yes

No

Source: 1993 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide
* More qualifications apply.

less attractive; nevertheless, it is an option that should be considered. The
option is especially important if, as discussed in the next chapter, banks and
other financial institutions are brought under the general regime of the cor
porate franchise tax. One of the main problems of doing so is that banks and
other financial institutions tend to have abnormally low net incomes when
interest from federal securities is exempt.
Only the tax rates for the net income tax are comparable to
those used in other states, since O hio is one of few states with a substantial
(uncapped) net worth tax and the only one in which the net worth tax is paid
when the liability is larger than under the net income tax. In terms of the net
income tax, O h io’s rates are in the upper range of the spectrum. By com
parison to a selected group of 16 other states shown in Table 10-16, only four
states have higher rates for corporate net incomes than Ohio. The highest
rate is charged by Pennsylvania, 12.25 percent. Iowa has a progressive sched
ule reaching a marginal rate of 12 percent for net incomes above $250,000.
Closer to O h io’s rate are Minnesota, with a rate of 9.8 percent, and New
York, with a rate of 9 percent.

Tax rates.
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TABLE 10-12
States with Modified Apportionment Formulas

State

Alternative Formula

Ohio

Double-weighted sales factor formula.

Colorado

By election, a corporation may use either the two-factor formula
(sales and property) or the equally weighted three-factor formula.

Connecticut

Double-weighted sales factor formula.

Florida

Double-weighted sales factor formula.

Illinois

Double-weighted sales factor formula.

Effective Dale

1983
1981
1983
1987

Iowa

Single factor sales formula.

Kansas

By election, a corporation may use either the equally weighted
three-factor formula or two-factor formula of property and sales (if
payroll exceeds average of such factors by 200%).

Kentucky

Double-weighted sales factor formula.

Massachusetts

Double-weighted sales factor formula.

Minnesota

Sales weighted 70% and property and payroll weighted 15%each.

Mississippi

Manufacturing-retailer uses sales, plus average of property-payroll
(denominator is two) formula. Manufacturer-wholesaler uses
equally weighted three-factor formula. Single-factor sales formula
for retailing, renting, servicing and merchandising.

Missouri

By election, a corporation may use either the equally weighted
three-factor formula or the single-factor sales formula.1

Nebraska

Single-factor sales formuala.

New Hampshire

(1.5 sales + 1 property + payroll) -s-3

New York

Double-weighted sales factor formula.

North Carolina

Double-weighted sales factor formula.

Oregon

Double-weighted sales factor formula.

Texas

Single-factor sales formula.

West Virginia

Double-weighted sales factor formula

198«
1978
1987
1988

1992

Wisconsin______________Double-weighted sales factor formula____________________________

Source: Updated from J.

1988

Coalson. “State and Local Corporate Tax Roundup,”

1976
1989
1991
1989
1986
1974

Corporate Taxation. Vol. 3, No.

1., May/June, 1992.
Alternative formula is calculated as: Missouri sales + all other sales times Net income
All sales
Effective date is 1992, with pre-1992 five year phase-in.
Updated from J. Coalson, "State and Local Corporate Tax Roundup,"
May/June, 1992.

Source:

Minimum Tax.

Corporate Taxation, Vol.

3, No. 1.,

Several states use an Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) to
gether with the regular corporate income tax (Table 10-17). In the selected
sample of states only New Jersey uses a fixed amount for a minimum tax.
Other states using a fixed amount minimum tax and not shown in Table 10
17 are Massachusetts with a flat tax of $456, Connecticut ($250), Vermont (
$150), and Utah ($100). Several states in the selected sample do impose a
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TABLE 10-13
Throwback Rules

Slate

Does State's Throwback Rule Apply to Sales?

Ohio

NO

Illinois

YES. If corporation is not taxable in state where property
its situs or was used.

Indiana

YES

Iowa

NO

Kentucky

NO

Michigan

YES

Minnesota

NO

Missouri

YES

Wisconsin

YES

California

YES

Colorado

YES. State where goods were shipped from.

Florida

NO

Georgia

NO

New Jersey

NO

New York

NO

North Carolina

NO

Pennsylvania

NO

Source:

had

1993 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide.

m inim um tax similar to the federal AMT. This is to ensure that corporations
do not take “excessive” deductions based on tax preferences. Corporations
need to compute the ordinary corporate income tax and the A M T simulta
neously. The latter has a wider base but at a lower rate. Corporations are re
quired to pay the larger of the two. The states of Iowa, New York, California,
and Florida all have such a tax. However, none of these states uses the com
putation of the federal A M T to implement its A M T
As we have seen in the previous sec
tion, O hio allows the carry forward of net operating losses under the net in
come tax for 15 years and no carry back of losses is allowed. The earn'
forward provision is almost universal in other states with a corporate income
tax, and an allowance of 15 years is the norm. Pennsylvania is the exception,
having eliminated the carry forward provision in 1994. About half of the
states sampled in Table 10-18 allow the carry back of losses for three years.
The use of the carry back provision offers a more favorable treatment to
business but at the same time tends to create more instability in state rev
enue collections.

NOL carryforwards and carry backs.
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TABLE 10-14
Conformity to Federal Rules

State

Does State Computation of Taxable Net Income Start
with a Figure from Federal Form 1120?

Ohio

Yes. Starts with taxable income BEFORE special deductions.

Illinois

Yes. Starts with taxable income AFTER special deductions.

Indiana

Yes. Starts with taxable income AFTER special deductions.

Iowa

Yes. Starts with taxable income AFTER special deductions and BEFORE NOL.

Kentucky

No.

Michigan

Yes. Starts with taxable income AFTER special deductions.

Minnesota

Yes. Starts with taxable income BEFORE special deductions.

Missouri

Yes. Starts with taxable income AFTER special deductions.

Wisconsin

Yes. Starts with taxable income BEFORE special deductions and NOL.

California

Yes. S uns with taxable income BEFORE special deductions.

Colorado

Yes. Starts with taxable income AFTER special deductions.

Florida

Yes. Starts with taxable income AFTER special deductions.

Georgia

Yes. Starts with taxable income AFTER special deductions.

New Jersey

Yes. Starts with taxable income BEFORE special deductions and NOL on single-entity
basis and NOL's.

New York

Yes. Starts with taxable income BEFORE special deductions.

North Carolina

Yes. Starts with taxable income BEFORE special deductions

Pennsylvania

Yes. Starts with taxable income BEFORE special deductions

Source: 1993 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide.

Miscellaneous taxes.

Ohio is not unique in adding minor miscellaneous
taxes to the corporate franchise tax. New Jersey, as Ohio, has litter control
taxes. However, most of the miscellaneous taxes in other states are in the na
ture of small franchise taxes on capital stock or net worth (Table 10-19).
O hio offers a number of incentives with the franchise tax,
including credits and exemptions, some of which are associated with setting
up business in an enterprise zone. Ohio is not out of line with many other
states which offer similar incentives. Most offer incentives for enterprise
zones. However, O hio is among the smaller group of states that use the fran
chise tax rather than sales and income taxes in their incentive programs.
Ohio is also the only state that reports using exemptions of assets as a form
of tax incentive to business activity.
Ohio allows combined
income reporting for a unitary group of corporations as long as the corpo
rations are all Ohio taxpayers and other conditions are met. There is con-

Tax incentives.

Combined income reporting for unitary businesses.
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TABLE 10-15
Treatment of Federal Obligations (Dividends and Interest)

State

U.S. Treasury Bills & Notes

Ohio

n

Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Michigan

(No corporate income lax, single business u x only)

Minnesota

X

Missouri
Wisconsin

X

California

X (franchise only)

Colorado
Florida

X

Georgia
New Jersey

X

New York

X

North Carolina
Pennsylvania

Source:

The deduction for interest income from U.S. obligations is reduced by the
interest incurred in carrying the securities and the expenses incurred in the
production of such income.

1993 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide.

X: Interest income from U.S. Government securities is taxable.

siderable diversity among the states on this issue (Table 10-20). While some
other states besides O hio make it optional for the taxpayers to use combined
reporting and/or the Department of Taxation to require it, there are many
more states that either require combined income reporting or disallow it
entirely.

M AIN ISSUES A N D PROBLEM S
T he N

et

W

orth

P o r t io n

o f the

Ta x

How common is the net worth tax or business assets taxes? An alterna
tive business tax falling on assets or net worth is not all uncommon. In fact,

The General Franchise Tax

541

TABLE 10-16
Tax Rates

State

Tax Rate

Ohio

Greater of ($0 - 50,000 = 5.1 * ; > $50,000 - 8 .9 * ) or (5.82 Mills multiplied
by net worth; a surtax o f . 11 % on the first $50,000 and .22% over $50T of net
income or .0014 of net worth).

Illinois

4.0® Corporate Rate
+ 2 0 .0 * Surcharge until 1993 (1 0 * after)
t . 2.5 X PfiBonal Properly Tax
- 7 .3 * before 1993

Indiana

3 .4 * of AGI + 4.5% supplemental net income tax

Iowa

$0-25,000 - 6 *
25.001-100,000 - 8 *
100.001-250,000 - 10*
> 250,000 = 12*

Kentucky

$0-25,000 - 4 *
25.001-50,000 « 5 *
50.001-100.000 = 6 *
100.001-200,000 = 7 *
> 200,000 = 8 *

Michigan

2 .3 5 * single business tax

Minnesota

9 .8 *

Missouri

$0-100,000 - 5 .0 *
100,001 -335,000 = 6 .0 *
> 335,000 = 6 .5 *

Wisconsin

7 .9 * + 5 .0 * recycling tax until 4/1/99
(Minimum recycling tax = $25; Maximum = $9,800)

California

9 .3 * , banks and financial institutions = 10.668*

Colorado

$0-50,000 = 5 * ; > $ 50,000 = 5 .1 *

Florida

5 .5 *

Georgia

6 .0 *

New Jersey

9 .0 * -1- .375* surcharge which is reviewed annually

New York

9 .0 * ; 8 .0 * graduated rate for small businesses
+ 10.0* surtax in 1993

North Carolina

7 .7 5 * plus surtaxes

Pennsylvania

12.25*

Source:

(1991 = 4 * . 1992 = 3 * )
(1993 = 2 * . 1994 = 1 * )

1993 Multistate Corporale Tax Guide.

Ohio is the only state that requires the tax payer to pay the higher of the two
taxes.30 Several states have a tax on net worth, some of these taxes are
capped and work as minim um taxes rather than as alternatives to the net in
come tax. Others such as Pennsylvania have extremely high net worth tax
rates.31
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TABLE 10-17
Alternative M inim um Tax

State

Does State Impose
a M inim um Tax?

Is State-Imposed
A M T Similar to
Federal AM T?

Ohio

Yes

No

$50

Illinois

No

N/A

N/A

Indiana

No

N/A

N/A

Iowa

Yes

Yes

7.2%

Kentucky

No

N/A

N/A

Michigan

No

N/A

N/A

Minnesota

Yes

Yes, With
Modifications

5.8%

Missouri

No

N/A

N/A

Wisconsin

No

N/A

N/A

California

Yes

Yes

7%

Colorado

No

N/A

N/A

Florida

Yes

No

3.3%

Georgia

No

N/A

N/A

Yes, Flat fee:
$25 domestic,
$50 foreign

No

N/A

New York

Yes

Yes

5%

North Carolina

No

N/A

N/A

Pennsylvania

No

N/A

N/A

New Jersey

Source:

W hat is State's
AM T Rate?

1993 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide.

There are a number of ways to look at the net worth tax and compare
across states. First, one could examine the percentage of corporate taxes
raised through the net worth tax. By including the financial services tax as
part of the net worth tax, O hio raises almost 50.1 percent of its corporate tax
revenues from the net worth tax (Table 10-1). No other state raises as much
as a proportion to total corporate tax revenues. However, other states such
as Pennsylvania taxes its corporations heavily through a 12.25 percent net
worth tax. This is a much higher rate than O h io ’s and potentially much more
burdensome.
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TABLE 10-18
Net Operating Loss Carry Forwards and Carry Backs

C arry Backs Allowed?

State

C arry Forwards
Allowed?

No. o f Y e a n
C arry Backs
Allowed

No. of Years C arry
Forwards Allowed

Ohio

No

Yes (Ohio loss only)

N/A

IS

Illinois

Yes

Yes

3

IS

Indiana

Yes

Yes

3

IS

Iowa

Yes

Yes

3

IS

Kentucky

Yes

Yes

3

IS

Michigan

No. N O L is termed
‘ business loss. ‘

Yes. NOL is termed
‘business loss’

N/A

10

Minnesota

No

Yes

N/A

IS

Missouri

Yes

Yes

3

IS

No

Yes

N/A

IS

California

No

Yes

N/A

IS

Colorado

No

Yes

N/A

IS

Florida

No

Yes

N/A

IS

Georgia

Yes

Yes

3

IS

Sew Jersey

No

Yes

N/A

7

New York

Yes. lim ited to first
S10T o f loss for each
year.

Yes, SAF. except limited
to first S10T of loss.

3

IS

North Carolina

No

Yes. net

N/A

5

Pennsylvania

None allowed after the
1991 tax year.

Wisconsin

.

economic loss.

Source. 1993 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide.

Alternative taxes on assets or net worth have become more popular
around the world over the last decade, but still are far from common.32Some
European countries have such a tax. Germany levies a net assets tax with a
rate between 0.6 and 0.75 percent, and this tax is not allowed as a deduction
or a credit from the regular corporate income tax. Austria has a net asset tax
with a rate of 1.35 percent, but this tax is allowed as a deduction from the
regular corporate income tax. Norway uses a 0.3 percent tax on net assets,
and no deduction is allowed from the corporate income tax.
Business taxes on assets have become particularly popular in Latin
America.33 Mexico implemented an alternative asset tax five years ago and
since then many other countries in Latin America such as Argentina and
Venezuela, have introduced some form of business asset tax. However, in
Latin America this type of tax is actually used as an administrative measure
for controlling evasion when the tax administration apparatus cannot make
the corporate income tax work properly.34 For this reason, asset taxes are al-
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TABLE 10-19
Miscellaneous Taxes on Business Activities

State

Name o f Tax

Tax Base

Tax Rate Schedule

Ohio

Two tier litter tax

Illinois

Various

N/R

N/R

Indiana

Gross Income Tax

All gross receipts of a taxpayer
with special exemptions and/or
deductions

Varies

Iowa

N/A

Kentucky

Corporation License Tax

Capital employed

.21%

Michigan

N/A

N/R

N/R

Minnesota

N/A

Missouri

N/A

Wisconsin

N/R

California

N/A

Colorado

N/A

Florida

Intangibles Tax

Stocks, bonds, value of
receivables on 1/1

1.5 mills.

Georgia

Net Worth Tax

Net Worth

$10 Minimum to $5,000 on net
worth in excess of $22 million

New Jersey

Litter Control Tax

N/R

N/R

Gross Income Tax
Withholding

N/R

N/R

Spill Compensation Tax

N/R

N/R

Fixed Dollar Minimum

Predetermined dollar amounts,
based on gross payroll

Varies

Capital

Allocated business and
investment capital

1.78 mills per $1 of allocated
capital; .9 mills per $1
allocated subsidiary capital

Organization Tax

Authorized and issued capital
stock

.05 of 1% of par value; 5 cents
per share of no par stock

North Carolina

Franchise Tax

Capital stock, surplus, and
undivided profits

$1.50 per $1,000

Pennsylvania

Capital Stock/Franchise Tax

Fixed formula variation of
capital stock

13 mills

New York

Source: 1993 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide.

most always used as alternative minim um taxes creditable against the regu
lar corporate income tax and often can be carried forward as a credit for sev
eral years.35
The most important ad
vantage of the net worth tax is that it has provided the state with a more sta
ble source o f revenues over the years. The data in Table 10-21 show

Advantages o f a net worth or business assets tax.
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TABLE 10-20
Unitary Business

State

Treatm ent o f U nitary
Business C om binations

Does Unitary Business
Include W orldwide
Activities?

Is i Water's-Fdge Unitary
Method Available?

Ohio

O ptional only if the unitary members are
O hio taxpayers.

No

Yes. upon arrival

Alabama

Not Allowed

N/A

N/A

Alaska

Required

Yes. until 1-92 for non
oil cos.

Yes. After 1-92

Arizona

Required

No

No

Arkansas

Not Allowed

N/A

N/A

California

Required

Yes

Yes

Colorado

Required

No

Yes

Connecticut

Allows taxpayer to petition for an
alternative allocation method

N/A

N/A

Delaware

Not Allowed

N/A

N/A

Florida

Not Allowed

N/A

N/A

Georgia

Optional. State can force Unitary.
Taxpayer cannot elect to apply it.

No

No

Hawaii

Required State s option only

No

Yes

Idaho

Required

Yes

Yes

Illinois

Required

No (Yes before 1982)

No (Waters-Edge after 1982)

Indiana

Optional for state and taxpayer

Yes (Taxpayer's option)

Yes

Iowa

Not Allowed

N/A

N /A

Kansas

Required

No

No

Kentucky

O ptional for state and taxpayer

No

Yes (All applications of
unitary treatment)

Louisiana

Not Allowed

N/A

N/A

Required

No

No

Not Allowed

N/A

N/A

No

No

Michigan

No

No

Minnesota

No

No

No

No

N/A

N/A

Yes

Yes (3-year renewable

Maine
Maryland

Missouri
Montana

Required

Nebraska

period)
No

No

No. (Dividends from
foreign unitary affiliates
are taxed after a foreign
factor relief.)

No. (Water's-Edge is
required.)

Nevada
New
Hampshire

Required

continued
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TABLE 10-20 (continued)
Unitary Business

Slate

Treatm ent o f Unitary
Business C om binations

Does Unitary Business
Include W orldw ide
Activities?

Is a W ater s-Edge Unitary
Method Available?
N /A

New Jersey

Not Allowed

N/A

New Mexico

Optional for taxpayer. State cannot force.

No

No

New York

Optional for state and taxpayer.

Yes. Alien corporations
not included.

No

North Carolina

Not Allowed

N/A

N/A

North Dakota

Required. Commissioner may require or
permit unitary treatment.

Yes

Yes

Oklahoma

Optional for state

No

Yes

Oregon

Required

No

No. Required by state

Pennsylvania

Not Allowed

N/A

N/A

Rhode Island

N /A

N/A

N/A

South Carolina

Not Allowed

N/A

N/A

South Dakota

N o corporate tax

Tennessee

Optional for state

No

Yes

Texas

Not Allowed

N/A

N/A

Utah

Required

If taxpayer elects.

Yes

Vermont

Required. Note that unitary reporting for
Vermont is N OT combined reporting

No

No

Virginia

Not Allowed

N/A

N/A

Washington

N o corporate Tax

West Virginia

Taxpayer may request or state may force.

No

Yes. after formal request by
taxpayer

Wisconsin

Not Allowed. All corporations are taxed
as separate entities.

N/A

N/A

W yoming

N o corporate tax
N/A

N/A

DC.

Not Allowed
Source: 1993 Muitistate Corporate Tax Guide.

liabilities for the corporate franchise tax from 1988 to 1993, together with
what the tax liability would have been had there been no net worth tax com
ponent in the present franchise tax. O f course, without adjustment of rates,
revenues from the franchise tax would have been lower. But what is more
important, revenues would have been less stable. The rate of change (posi
tive or negative) from period to period is often twice as much for the fran
chise tax without the net worth tax as for the franchise tax with the net worth
tax. The higher relative instability in the franchise tax without its net worth
component is reflected in a coefficient of variation for this series that is dou
ble the size of the coefficient of variation for the series including the net
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TABLE 10-21
Corporate Franchise Tax Liability With and Without
Net Worth Tax Component, 1988-1993

Tax Year

Total with Net
W orth

Percent Change over
Previous Year

Total without Net Worth:
Net Income Basis Only

Percent Change over
Previous Year

$586,959,047

—

1988

$719,430,413

1989

771.130.137

7.2

645.077.393

9.9

1990

728.156.622

-5.6

585.163.816

-9.3

1991

650.538.338

•10.7

461.164.160

•21.2

1992

613.496.098

-5.7

429.994.616

•6 8

1993

630.040.000

2.7

422.805.000

•1.7

Coefficient of
Variation*

0.083

-

—

0.166

—

Sources: Ohio Department of Taxation. A nnual Report and our own computation.
‘Computed on the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean value in the series.

worth tax. Thus, recent data confirm the intuition that the net worth com
ponent of the franchise tax adds stability to overall tax revenue collections.
Are there any other positive side benefits of the net worth tax? The other
main advantage of taxes on net worth or assets is, as we have seen, as an ad
ministrative measure to control tax evasion and aggressive avoidance.
Several other arguments have been used in defense of these taxes, but none
is strong or completely convincing.
In the case of a closed economy with little mobility of capital, an asset tax
tends to have the same effect as a land tax. It gives an incentive to owners of
capital to put capital to its most productive use. One can hardly afford own
ing capital that is not being used to its full potential. But this argument
hardly applies to O hio or any other state because the economy is fully open
and capital is mobile. In an open economy with capital mobility, the tax on
net worth will encourage the exit of capital from the state or retard the entry
of new capital. To the extent that Ohio taxes capital more heavily than other
states (in a combination of property, net worth, and corporate income
taxes), then state residents (either as consumers, workers, or owners of land)
will tend to pay for the heavier capital taxation. Their payment may take the
form of higher prices, lower wages, and lower prices of land or other fixed
inputs.
Some economists have supported the idea of a tax on fixed assets because
all marginal profits become tax exempt and economic activity is thus en
couraged. But this does not apply to the Ohio franchise tax because higher
marginal profits will eventually trigger the net income tax. Also important in
the long run is the fact that capital assets are not fixed and; consequently, a
net worth tax is not free of distortions. On the administrative side, asset
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taxes reduce the ability of interstate and international companies to do tax
planning or transfer pricing schemes to reduce their tax liabilities.
Finally, an additional benefit of a net worth tax is its (potential) simplic
ity. This is a main reason why the tax has become more popular in develop
ing economies. Tax administration in developing countries tends to be
weaker, with limited capabilities to audit, for example, sophisticated tax
companies. Taxing net worth is attractive because the tax base is easier to
recognize by tax auditors and revenue collectors. As an economy develops,
presumably the tax administration, itself, becomes more sophisticated and is
better able to administer and audit income taxes, including those of larger
multinational corporations.
The major problem with O hio’s corpo
rate franchise tax is its net worth component. The unpopularity of the net
worth tax among taxpayer corporations, as we will see, is not surprising. The
net worth component has caused more litigation problems than any other
aspect of the franchise tax. The most important criticisms and shortcomings
of the net worth tax are examined in the following paragraphs.
The list of criticisms and shortcomings of the net worth tax is a long one.
First, taxpayers feel that the net worth tax is unfair because it puts an addi
tional burden on those companies that have had a bad year, with low income
or net losses. The tax comes at a time when enterprises are least able to af
ford it, and thus it increases their financial risk. This may be particularly
damaging to new companies, which often have several years of losses.35 In
1993, $158 million was paid in net worth taxes (out of a total of $228 million)
by corporations with zero or negative net incomes.
Second, the tax is horizontally inequitable because it depends on the
structure of the business. Some business sectors may require more (or
fewer) capitalization for technological reasons and consequently more (or
less) risk and maturation periods for profit-making. In this sense, the net
worth tax can be viewed as discriminatory— favoring enterprises that are
lightly capitalized, such as those in the service sector, and penalizing enter
prises more heavily capitalized, such as those in the manufacturing sector.
Both types of companies would pay the net income tax in years of good per
formance, but in a recession those sectors that are more heavily capitalized
may pay a much higher net worth tax.
Third, the net worth tax discriminates against companies with headquar
ters in Ohio. This arises from the fact that the property factor of the appor
tionment formula for the net worth tax situses to Ohio intangible assets such
as bank deposits, investments in other businesses, and securities that the
corporation owns outside Ohio. This penalty is more serious for the parent
or holding companies domiciled in Ohio and for those who own most of
their assets in intangibles. Discrimination against Ohio companies also
arises from the inclusion in the “business done” factor of the net worth
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formula of receipts from intangible assets which are sitused to Ohio (and
only for O hio companies), regardless of where they may actually be used.
Fourth, the net worth tax is a source of double taxation. This arises first
because the net worth tax falls on the same assets as are taxed by the prop
erty tax. The issue of double taxation of property has become more acute
with the repeal in 1993 of the credit against the franchise tax for property
taxes paid. That credit, it has been argued, helped equalize property tax bur
dens for companies located in different local jurisdictions across Ohio.37 A
second issue of double taxation arises when both parent company and sub
sidiaries located in O hio have to pay the net worth tax. However, this form
of double taxation is being partially addressed with the new credit for in
vestment in qualified subsidiaries.
Fifth, the net worth tax makes taxpayer compliance much harder and
costlier. Both tax bases under the franchise tax, net income and net worth,
must be fully computed every year despite the fact that only one will be used.
The computation of the net worth tax is especially cumbersome because it
requires the situsing of every component in the balance sheet based on com
plex rules which in some instances go back at least half a century.38
Sixth, the net worth tax distorts the method of financing and it encour
ages thin capitalization. Corporations that add to their real assets by bor
rowing from a bank or issuing debt will not experience an increase in their
net worth tax base. However, those corporations that purchase the same real
assets financing them with new equity issues will experience an increase in
the tax base by the entire amount of the investment. Thus, the marginal ef
fective rate of taxation on the same asset goes from zero, if financed with
debt, to a positive rate of taxation if the asset is not exempt. The effective
marginal rate of taxation on any asset also depends on other provisions in
the law, ranging from tax credits to depreciation rules.39
Seventh, the net worth tax may discourage investment in Ohio if the com
bination of the net income tax and net worth taxes imposes a tax burden on
capital invested in O hio that exceeds the average tax burden imposed on
capital in all other states. A common view of the incidence of the corporate
income tax is that the
burden imposed by corporate taxes may be
paid by all capital owners across the nation. However, taxing capital invest
ment more heavily than the average state will drive or keep investment out
of this higher tax state as long as the after tax rate of return to capital is
higher in other states. Because of the lower capital investment in the state,
the tax burden of higher corporate taxes in reality is shifted to other factors
of production in the state that are less mobile, such as labor and land.*"
This tendency of the net worth tax to drive or keep out corporate invest
ment in Ohio will be more pronounced in the more heavily capitalized sec
tors, such as manufacturing. Manufacturing has been the backbone of
Ohio’s economy, although it has suffered a considerable decline in recent
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times. The question is to what extent the net worth tax has been a significant
contributing factor to this decline.

A

p p o r t io n m e n t

Form ulas

There are several important differences between the apportionment for
mulas for net income and net worth. The first and most obvious one is that
net income is apportioned according to three factors (payroll, property, and
sales, with the latter double-weighted), while net worth is apportioned ac
cording to two factors (property and sales). Less obvious but just as impor
tant is the fact that the definitions of the property and sales factors differ
significantly in the two formulas.
The property factor in the net worth formula includes all types of assets:
tangibles and intangibles. In contrast, the property factor in the net income
formula includes only real and tangible personal property, including lease
hold improvements and the value of rented property. The inclusion of in
tangibles in the net worth formula has created problems for situsing the
property and has given corporations an incentive to establish their legal
domiciles outside of Ohio.
The “business done” factor in the net worth formula is also a wider con
cept than the receipts from sales used in the net income formula. The busi
ness done factor includes not only sales of tangible property and revenue
from services but also rents and royalties, dividends and interest, patent
copyrights, and in some cases the sale of assets.41 Dividends, interest, royal
ties, and other intangible income are treated as allocable income under the
net income tax and, therefore, do not enter the net income apportionment
formula.
The differences in the two formulas highlight some contradictions in the
philosophy underlying the two components of O h io ’s franchise tax. Under
the net income base, a larger part of the tax is shifted to taxpayers outside
O hio by the fact that the sales factor is double weighted. The exclusion of al
locable income from the sales factor also has the same effect, since its in
clusion would increase the numerator of the factor more than the
denominator. The exclusion of intangible property in the property factor of
the net income tax also favors O hio companies, since most of the intangible
property would be sitused in Ohio.
Under the net worth tax, the computation of the two factor formula shifts
the tax burden more towards O hio corporations. This is because income
from intangible assets is included in the business factor and intangible assets
are included in the property factor. As a consequence, O hio companies ex
perience an increase in both factors vis-a-vis non-Ohio companies, since
most intangible property and income have an O hio situs.
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As discussed above, Ohio statutes do not address the issue of what to do
with the factors in the net income apportionment formula when part of the
corporation’s business takes place in a state that has no corporate income
tax. By not adjusting the formula to these circumstances corporations actu
ally obtain a lower tax. Some states have adopted adjustments in the formula
by following a “throwback” rule, which assigns to the factor numerator of
the taxing state the activity carried out in the states without a corporation
tax, or a “throw out” rule, which eliminates from both the numerator and
the denominator of the factor the activities carried out in the noncorporate
tax states.

R e p o r t in g : S e p a r a t e E n t it y V e r s u s
C o m b in e d I n c o m e R

e p o r t in g

Most economists would agree that combined income reporting is the only
sensible way to go about apportioning income to a state for any corporation
that is part of a unitary or related business operating in that state or several
states.42
The present approach of giving the option to file with combined income
reporting when some minimum requirements arc met almost certainly guar
antees that the only groups of corporations filing combined reports are
those that can reduce their tax liability by doing so. Other corporations that
use intercorporate transactions within and out of the state for tax planning
purposes are not expected, of course, to file combined income reports.
The Tax Commissioner can require combined income reporting for a
group of interrelated corporations. In practice this has been a complex and
litigious process. In addition, the statutes also limit the initiative of the
Commissioner in this respect. For example, since 1992 interest payments be
tween related members, or charges for the use of intangible property, can
not be considered sufficient grounds for requiring combined income
reporting.43
Thus, the important issue here is how much income tax is avoided in Ohio
because the majority of the corporations file as separate entities. Separate
entity reporting leaves open many potential loopholes for tax avoidance.
These range from the most apparent and well-known, such as the use of outof-state passive investment companies (better known as Delaware holding
companies), to the more sophisticated (and harder to detect) transfer pric
ing schemes.
Some of these problems have been addressed with recent legislation in
Ohio. The reform of the franchise tax law in 1991 ( “Budget Bill Am. Sub.
H. 298) had two main objectives. The first was to make Ohio corporations
take over certain gains recognized by “non taxpayer” (for Ohio purposes)
related entities. The second was to deny Ohio corporations deductions for
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interest and other intangible expenses (such as charges for the use of intan
gible property, royalties, patents, copyright fees and licensing fees) paid to
“related entities” which for the most part are passive investment companies
(“Delaware holding companies l l ) . 44
There are other significant forms of intra-unitary transactions that the
1991 reform did not address. These include the use of affiliated non-Ohio
companies to hold assets generating investment income, the overstatement
of costs and understatement of revenues through transfer pricing, and
changes in location to avoid the situsing of assets to Ohio. To be fair, there
is no law that can be comprehensive enough to deal with all these issues. But
being able to take care of all these issues is the fundamental advantage of
combined income reporting.

M

in im u m

Ta x

The m inim um tax of $50 in O hio may be too low. It has not been changed
for many years despite inflation. In fact, the actual amount of $50 may now
be under what it actually costs the Department of Taxation to process a tax
return.

T a x in g I n t e r e s t F r o m F e d e r a l

and

O

h io

S e c u r i t ie s

At present O hio exempts interest from both federal government and
State of O hio securities. This conforms with the practice of many other
states. In order to tax federal interest income it would be necessary to tax
O hio interest income. There are some states that do this. The attraction of
this option is that it would facilitate the coverage of financial institutions
under the general franchise tax. Banks and other financial institutions earn
a good portion of their income from holding federal government securities
in their portfolios.

A

l l o c a t io n

V ersus A

p p o r t io n m e n t

O

f

In c o m e

Is there a good rationale for keeping the distinction between allocable
and apportionable income? Should this distinction be reformed, or even
abandoned? Actually there are at least twelve states that do not distinguish
between allocable and apportionable income. These are known as “full ap
portionment states.”45 Many other states, including Ohio, distinguish be
tween allocable and apportionable income. Most often what is
apportionable and what is allocable income depends on whether the income
is defined as business or non-business income, respectively. Business income
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is generally defined as that earned during the regular course of business.46The presumption for the distinction lies in the fact that some income
is not earned by the application of factors of production but simply by the
corporate entity itself, and these should be sitused where the corporation is
domiciled. For example, dividend income from shares of other companies is
considered to be earned by the corporation in a way that is different from
the income derived from production and sale of goods and services. Many
of the distinctions, such as royalties and technical service fees as passive in
come, have little economic justification. Ohio is among the few states that
make no distinction between business and non-business income but instead
allocate certain types of income.
As in other areas of corporate state taxation, the potential for double tax
ation of certain types of income increases, because the same income may be
considered apportionable in one state and allocable in a different state.
The clear incentive for “headquarters” states is to classify income as allo
cable, because 100 percent of it is taxed in the state. The disadvantage is that
a very aggressive position on allocable income may cause some corporations
to choose a different state for domicile. States with relatively few or impor
tant company headquarters may have revenue advantages with the “full ap
portionment” approach.

Th e U s e
as a

W ay

of
to

C o r p o r a t e L i m i t e d Pa r t n e r s h ip s
A v o id

the

F r a n c h is e Ta x

Partnerships, and in particular corporate partnerships, have been used
for some time as a vehicle for tax planning. Multistate corporations may take
advantage of different regulations to structure transactions across states
boundaries to minimize taxes. One fundamental issue that arises with cor
porate partners that have no direct business activities in a state is whether or
not the corporate partner has tax nexus in the state because of its interest in
the partnership doing business in the state. Most states, including Ohio, con
sider the corporate partner to have nexus in the 46 state.47 Fewer states treat
the partner’s distributive share as income from an intangible asset, and they
source the income to the situs of the asset, i.e., to the state where the cor
porate partner has its domicile. The revenue implications of choosing be
tween the two regimes will differ from state to state, depending on the
number and importance of out-of-state corporate partners and state dom i
ciled corporations entering partnerships outside the state.
An increasing loophole has appeared in recent times, with non-Ohio cor
porations taking a limited partnership interest, directly or indirectly through
wholly owned non-Ohio subsidiaries in an Ohio partnership. As opposed to
the case of a general partnership interest in which the non Ohio corporation
or its subsidiaries are declared to have nexus in Ohio, limited partners are
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treated as individual stockholders and through multi layering of subsidiaries
may avoid income taxes entirely.
O hio has recently adopted legislation recognizing the new business form
of “limited liability company. “ In practice, this business form is taxed as a
partnership that has only limited partners. The important issue here is that
this new development could be used for tax avoidance schemes similar to
those now being used with limited partnerships.
There are no easy solutions to the problem created by the use of limited
partnerships by out-of-state corporations to escape the franchise tax in
Ohio. Probably the simplest solution would be to change the law so that cor
porate limited partners can be ruled to have nexus in Ohio and, therefore,
be subject to the corporate franchise tax. However, this approach may face
many legal hurdles. A second solution, currently being studied by the
Department of Taxation, is to use a withholding system in which the flow
through entity is treated as a taxable entity, and the upstream corporations
are credited for taxes already paid. A third solution is for the state of Ohio
to adopt mandatory combined income reporting. Relying on discretionary
rulings by the Tax Commissioner to require combined income reporting
would be very likely too time consuming and, given the past history of simi
lar rulings, ineffective.

M

u n ic ip a l

I n c o m e Ta x e s

About 500 local jurisdictions in Ohio levy individual and business income
taxes. These taxes represent a significant source of revenue for local gov
ernments. One important issue is that this system of local taxation imposes
heavy compliance costs on businesses because almost every jurisdiction has
a different tax, with variations in the tax base, filing dates, and other admin
istrative procedures. In the extreme case, an Ohio company would have to
file close to 500 different taxes with complex administrative and appeal pro
cedures.48

M e m b e r s h ip in

UDITPA

There would be several benefits derived from joining the Multistatc Tax
Compact (M T C ) and subscribing to the Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act. Many other states do follow UDITPA, although often with
some modifications. A selected sample of states that do follow UDITPA is
shown in Table 10-11. Among the most important benefits of joining the
M T C are easy tax coordination with many other states that have joined the
Tax Compact, use of the multistate audits of some corporations undertaken
by the Tax Compact, and access to the interpretative rulings for difficult-to-
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tax economic sectors. O n the other hand, Ohio has in its own way adopted
many of the rules in UDITPA, and joining would not be cost free. The move
might be regarded as anti-business, and the state would have to change
important aspects of the franchise tax to adapt to UDITPA.

REFORM OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
R e f o r m in g

the

N

et

W

orth

Ta x

repeal the net worth component

One major reform option is to
of the fran
chise tax. The new corporate franchise tax would be based exclusively on the
present corporate profit or net income.
The overall impact of this change is shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table
10-22. The overall franchise tax liabilities for 1993 would have decreased
from $630 million to $434 million, approximately a 31 percent decline. The
elimination of the net worth tax would not affect those corporations that
were already paying the net income tax, because this was the higher of either
the net worth tax or the net income tax. The corporations that would bene
fit from the reform are those corporations that were paying the net worth
tax. However, some of these corporations that had positive net income
would now pay the net income tax. This “residual” net income tax would
have amounted to approximately $32 million, and this is included in the total
net income tax in column 3 of Table 10-22 of $434 million. The simple repeal
of the net worth tax basis produces winners by all asset sizes and in all eco
nomic sectors, although winners are concentrated among the largest com
panies by net worth size.
The repeal of the net worth tax may be accompanied by several additional
reforms. A central consideration of the complementary reforms is whether
the entire package is to be made revenue-neutral. That is, do the new taxes
make up for the losses in revenues represented by the elimination of the net
worth tax? O r should no attempt be made to fully recover the lost revenues
with the corporate franchise tax, leaving this task perhaps to other elements
of the tax structure?
There are, of course, many possibilities
that can be devised within the corporate income tax to make up for the rev
enue losses caused by the repeal of the net worth component. They range
from the introduction of a new separate tax on assets to changes in the base
and rate of the net income tax. Combinations of several or all of these op
tions could also be used instead of one simple option.
Here we consider three basic options: (i) the introduction of a new net
worth tax that differs from the old tax in base, rate, and apportionment for
mula; (ii) the introduction of a new asset tax, and (iii) an increase in the rate
of the net income tax. Changes in the structure of the present net income

Revenue-neutral reform options.
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TABLE 10-22
Reforming the Franchise Tax: Eliminating O ld Net Worth Tax,
Revenue Neutral Option 1

Net Worth Tax Using Reduced Base and Income Tax Combined
Revised Tax Rate ■ 0.13g%
Base
Corporate Tax

Net Worth
Less than I

Income Tax

S33.862.764

S32.484.779

Over 1 • 200.000

32.249.202

200.001 • 500.000
500.001 • 2.300.000

25.889.826

2.500.001 - 5,000.000

62.081.815
27.672.764

5.000.001 - 20,000.000

69.590.881

Reduced Base Net
Calculated
Worth Tax
Corporate Tax

Winners

Losers

Evtn

S I.586.750

$34.071.529

0%

22.648.858

78.480

22.727.338

17.056.832

114.562

17.171.395

12%
71%

26%

3%

41.957.122

991,836

42.948.958

37%

61%

20.612.339

1,667,925

22.280.264

24%

76%

51.720.568

5,902,115

.20%

80%

63%

36%
44%

2%
4%

98%
84%

104.136.346

71.945.004

35,356,683

57.622.683
107.301.687

100.000.001 • 250.000.000

62.431.082

43.731.704

26,183.638

69.915.342

31%

250.000.001 - 500.000.000

50.38.1815

32.558.519

29.098.608

61.657,127

40%

60%

500.000. 001 - 750.000.000

27.084.813

49.826.248

18%

11.590.126

15.493.821
6.955.357

34.332.427

750.000.001 • 1.000.000.000

39,439.230

46.394.587

43%

80%
57%

121.069.256

76.910.625

21.507.447

98.418.072

42%

58%

17%

19%

2%
0%
0%
1%
25%
0%
2%
0%
0%
0.65

Losers

Even

20.000.001 - 100.000.000

Over 1 Billion
Grand Tout

S63Q.Q4Q.69Q

Economic Sectors
Agriculture. Forestry, and
Fishing

Base
Corporate Tax

Income Tax

$2.886.417

S I.822.435

$49.663

Reduced Base Net
Calculated
Worth Tax
Corporate Tax

Winners

$1.872.098

0%

100%

0%

Mining

12.495.690

4,519,910

2.081.746

6.601.656

73%

19%

7%

Construction

22.223.744

16.288.119

1.731.008

18.019.127

52%

42%

288.514.301

215,100.251

84.620.539

299.720.790

42%

48%

Transponat ion

50.709.262

30.443,411

5.230.586

35.673.997

66%

24%

5%
10%
11%

Wholesale Trade

50.174.092

36.713.264

50.187.305

38%

67.201.264

52.503,273

6.217,814

58.721.087

30%
44%

32%

Retail Trade

49%

7%

Finance. Insurance, and Real
Estate

55.122.385

26.130.085

71,486.014

97.616.100

33%

61%

7%

69%

Manufacturing

13,474,041

Services

60.897.735

40,282.818

8.252.912

48.535.730

18%

14%

Unclassified

19.815.780

10.271.961

3,115,379

13.387.340

0%

3%

97%

Grand Tool

S630.040.689

S434.075.528

$196.259.702

$630.335.230

17%

19%

65%

tax, such as changes in credits or adjustments to taxable income, would not
by themselves make up for the revenue gap produced by the repeal of the
net worth tax. More importantly, changes in the structure of the net income
tax should be considered in terms of their impact on horizontal equity, eco
nomic development, and other objectives rather than in terms of their im
pact on revenue.
(i)

New net worth tax. The new net worth tax would be paid by all corpo

rations, including those paying the net income tax. It would be structured in
a way that eliminates the main problems now existing with the net worth
basis of the franchise tax. The tax base would comprise the corporation’s eq
uity account (capital stock net of treasury stock, additional paid-in capital,
and retained earnings) and the apportionment ratio would be the three-fac
tor double-weighted sales formula currently used for the net income tax.
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The most important change in the tax base of this new net worth tax visa-vis the current net worth tax would be the elimination of reserves and de
ferred taxes. These changes could be justified to the extent that both
deferred taxes and reserves are set to offset future liabilities, and in that
sense they should not be considered as part of the corporation’s net worth.
However, this is a debatable point.
In particular, some reserves are set against future contingent liabilities
which may never materialize. The level of reserves a corporation sets aside
differs by type of business and other characteristics including management
style. Even though most businesses have limits on how much they can put
into reserves and for how long they will be able to hold idle reserves, it is
clear that their exclusion from the net worth tax base is an opportunity for
tax avoidance and a source of uneven tax treatment among otherwise simi
lar firms. The data in Table 10-23 show the ratio of reserves and deferred
taxes to total net worth by size of firm (measured by net worth) and by eco
nomic sector, based on sample data from 1,377 corporation returns for 1993.
These sample data show wide variations in the ratio, ranging from close to
zero to 10 percent. O n the other hand, the inclusion of reserves can lead to
the unequal treatment of corporations with equal “long term” net worth.
The inclusion or exclusion of reserves in the tax base will simply translate
into a lower or higher tax rate that will need to be applied to attain the rev
enue target. We used a sample of tax returns to simulate the new net worth
as if it had been in effect in 1993.49 These simulations are presented in the
fourth column of Table 10-22. Besides the reduced base for the new net
worth tax and the same apportionment formula as for the net income tax, we
assume a tax rate of 0.138 percent for the new tax. This rate is dictated by
the condition of revenue neutrality for the entire reform option: elimination
of the current net worth tax, universal application of the net income tax, and
introduction of the new net worth tax with overall revenue neutrality. Table
10-22 is constructed to include the overall or combined tax burden of a uni
versal net income tax and the new net worth tax by asset size and economic
sector in the fifth column.
The rate structure of the new net worth tax could be chosen to have dif
ferent profiles, including other flat rates which will not allow revenue neu
trality for the entire package. With revenue neutrality, as simulated in Table
10-22, 19 percent of the corporations would be losers, i.e., would pay a
higher combined net income and new net worth tax. The clear net losers are
those corporations now paying net income tax which would also have to pay
the new net worth tax. Some corporations now paying the net worth tax may
also be losers if they have enough positive net income. The simulations show
that 17 percent of the corporations would be winners: they would be paying
a lower combined tax than under the present franchise tax. The winners
would be corporations with low or negative net incomes that are now paying
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TABLE 10-23
Ratio of Deferred Taxes and Reserves to Total Net Worth,
by Economic Sector and Net Worth Size
Economic Sectors
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing

0.0129

Mining

0.0755

Construction

0.0166

Manufacturing

0.0491

Transportation

0.0981

Wholesale Trade

0.0281

Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate

0.083
0.0907

Services

0.0122

Unclassified

0.0251

Net Worth ($)
1

0.0268

200,000

0.0002

500,000

0.1073

2,500,000

0.0255

5,000,000

0.022

20,000,000

0.0397

100,000,000

0.077

250,000,000

0.0477

500,000,000

0.0802

750,000,000

0.0832

1,000,000,000

0.0446

Over 1 billion

0.0825

Source:

Based on sample data from 1,377 franchise tax returns.

the net worth tax at a 0.582 percent rate rather than the 0.138 percent rate
used in the simulations for the new net worth tax.
Although the majority of corporations, 65 percent, would not be affected
by the changes in the net worth tax, the vast majority of these companies are
those with net worth between $0 and $200,000.
The winners and losers by size of net worth and by economic sector, as
shown in the last three columns of Table 10-22, are quite evenly distributed.
Average-size firms in terms of net worth and those in the mining and trans
port sectors are the more likely winners.

The General Franchise Tax

559

This revenue-neutral simulation allows us to focus on the other important
goals of reform. Despite the fact that they produce equal revenues, the uni
versal net income tax combined with a new net worth tax would be generally
preferable to the present net worth tax because it would be more horizon
tally equitable and produce less economic distortion, such as penalization of
new enterprises and penalization of corporations domiciled in Ohio.
However, the new net worth tax still would discriminate among companies
depending on how much of their assets were financed with debt and how
much were financed with equity. The next set of revenue-neutral simulations
would address this issue.
(ii)
An alternative to the new net worth tax is a tax on
total (nonexempt) assets. The advantage of the assets tax, vis-a-vis a net
worth tax, is that the formula does not discriminate among types of financ
ing; and, therefore, it does not induce thin capitalization. The simulations in
Table 10-24 are based again on the premise that the new total assets tax will

New total assets tax.

TABLE 10-24
Reforming the Franchise Tax: Eliminating Old Net Worth Tax,
Revenue Neutral Option 2
Crow Assets Tax and Income Tax Combined
Sft Assets Tax Rate - 0.0562%______________
Net Worth

Base
Corporate Tax

Income Tax

Total
Awet Tax

Calculated
Corporate Tax

Winners

Loser*

Even

0

0.04

096

22.756.560

0.14

0.06

0.8

250.079

17.306.912

0.62

0.18

0.2

818,900

42.776.021

0.39

0 19

0 59

0.18
0.01
0.25

$35,862,764

$32,484,779

$2,985,589

$35.470.368

Over I - 200.000

35.862.764

22.648.858

107.702

200.001 • 500,000

25.889.826

17.056.832

500.001 -2,500.000

62.081.815

41.957.122

l « j thaa 1

2.500.001 - 5.000.000

27.672.764

20.612.339

1.206.501

21.818.840

0.42
024

5.000.001 • 20,000.000

69.590.881

51.720.568

4.434.451

56.155.019

0.2

104.136.346

71.945.004

63.873.004

135.818.009

0.59

0.72
0.4

- »0.001 - 100.000.000

0.08

* .000.001 -250.000.000

62.431.082

43.731.704

24.813.989

68.545.693

0.38

0 38

250.000,001 - 500.000.000

50.381.815

32.558.519

26.021.706

58.580.225

04

06

0

• XX). 001 .750.000.000

27.084.813

15.493.821

26,294.948

41.788.769

0.46

0.02

0.57

0

'000.001 - 1.000.000.000
Over 1 Billion
Grind Tool

Economic Sector*
Agriculture. Forestry and
Fishing

11.590.126

6.955.357

28.661.292

35.616.649

0.53
0.43

121.069,256

76.910.625

17.288.963

94.199.588

0.56

0.44

0

$630.040.690

S434.075.528

SI96.757.125

S630.832.653

0 18

0 IS

0.65

F.ren

Base
Corporate Tax
$2,886,417

Income Tax
$1,822,435

Total
A«et Tax
$45.102

Calculated
Corporate Tax

Winners

losers

$1.867.537

0

06

0.4

0.31

0.12

Mining

12.495.690

4.519.910

2.548.231

7.068.141

0.57

Construction

22.223.744

16.288,119

1.238.843

17.526.962

0.52

Manufacturing

288.514.301

215.100.251

67.156.507

282.256.758

0.45

028
0.44

0.11

Transportation

50.709.262

3.044.341

4,528.256

34.971.668

0.66

0.27

0.07

Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade

50.174.092
67.201.264

36.713.264

18.838.865

55.552.129

0.32

0.46

0.21

52.503.273

6.744.377

59.247.650

0.44

0.37

0.19

! 1fiance. Insurance, and Real
Estate

55.122.385

26.130.085

83.525.498

109.655.583

0.33

0.57

0.11

Services

60.897.755

40.282.818

9.987.571

50.270.389

0.17

0.13

069

Unclassified

19.815.780

10.271.961

2.143.876

12.415.837

0.01

0.02

0.97

0 18

0 18 _

0 65

^

Total__________________

ilS 6 J 5 L U l

0.2
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have to generate enough revenue to cover the revenue gap produced by the
elimination of the present net worth tax. Revenue neutrality would have re
quired a tax rate on total assets of 0.056 percent in 1993. The simulations in
Table 10-24 are performed using the apportionment ratio from the net in
come tax.
The distribution by size of net worth and economic sector of the total as
sets tax is presented in the fourth column of Table 10-24. The combined bur
den of the universal net income tax and the new total assets tax is presented
in the fifth column. Overall, the distribution of the combined burden by size
of net worth and economic sector is quite similar to that in the previous sim
ulation with the “new net worth tax.” The percentages of corporations that
are winners and losers are almost identical in the aggregate. However, there
are more significant differences by net worth size and economic sector of the
corporations. These differences between the two sets of simulations high
light the relative arbitrariness of either tax base, as the ratio of net worth to
total assets is likely to differ from corporation to corporation for multiple
reasons.
Either tax, the new net worth or the total assets tax, still presents the
problems of all asset taxes discussed in Section 3 of this chapter. They im
pose a significant burden on enterprises when they may be least able to af
ford it, and in particular they penalize new enterprises which tend to go
through several years of losses. Either of these taxes may be more accept
able or justifiable at lower levels as a way to charge corporations for the use
of public services at the state level.50 This possibility is further discussed
below.
(iii)
An alternative way to cover the
revenue gap produced by the elimination of the net worth tax is to raise the
rate of the net income tax. This simulation is presented in Table 10-25.
Based on 1993 tax returns, revenue neutrality would have required an in
crease in the rate of 3.86 percentage points for net incomes above $50,000.
The new tax rate for net incomes over $50,000 would have been 12.76 per
cent, by comparison to the current rate of 8.9 percent. This would have
made O hio the state with the highest corporate income tax rate. At present,
the highest rate is Pennsylvania’s 12.25 percent. The simulations assume that
the current rate of 5.1 percent for net incomes below $50,000 stays the same.
The intended effect in the distribution of tax burdens is a more skewed dis
tribution, since now only those companies with positive net incomes would
pay tax. However, companies that now are paying the net worth tax will not
necessarily be large winners from this change. There are quite a few corpo
rations paying the net worth tax at the present time that do have positive net
incomes, and these companies would have to pay the new net income tax at
a considerably higher rate.
As we have seen in the second sec
tion, some states have along with the corporate net income tax a c o r p o r a t e

Raising the rate of the net income tax.

Non-revenue-neutral reform options.
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TABLE 10-25
Reforming the Franchise Tax: Eliminating Old Net Worth Tax,
Revenue Neutral Option 3
Lr*v Additional Income tax on Net Income over S50.000
V » T u Rale - 3.M %
_________________ ________

Income Tax.

Additional
Income Tax

Calculated
Corporate
Tax

$32,484,779

$12,653,125

$45,137,904

99%

32.249.202

23.729.619

1%

86%

200.001 -500.000

25,889.826

17.056.832

1,080.760
993.127

0%
14%

1%

22,648.858

18.049.960

71%

41.957.122

11.892.096

53.849.217

42%

13%
58%

16%

5a 001 - 2.500.000
: 500.001 • 5.000.000

62.081.815
27.672.764

20.612.339

11,041,390

31.653.729

24%

76%

0%

$.000,001 • 20.000.000

69,590,881

24.143.682

24%

76%

0%

Base
Corporate Tax
$35,862,764

Over 1 200.000

V i Worth ($)
Leu thin I

Winners

l-osen

E*en

1%

104.136,346

51.720,568
71,945.004

39,450.860

75.864.250
111.395.864

74%

25%

1%

100.000.001 - 250.000.000

62.431.082

43.731.704

22.449.196

66.180.900

44%

25%

250,000.001 - 500.000.000

50,381.815

32.558.519

51.131.647

45%

ST .000,001 - 750.000.000

27.084.813

15.493.821

18.573.129
13.282,754

31%
16%

28.776.575

19%

80%

2%

'50.000.001 - 1.000.000.000

11.590.126

6.955.357

4,460,811

56%

44%

0%

121.069.256

76.910.625

11.416.168
112.820.407

43%

57%

0%

20%

13%

67%

w im n
0%

60%

:o ooo.ooi - ioo.ooo.ooo

0>*r 1 Billion

2

35.909.783

Grand Tool

$630 040.690

Economic Sectors

Base
Corporate Tax

Income Tax

Additional
Income Tax

$2,886,417

$1,822,435

$532,426

Agriculture, Forestry, and
Fishing

519^30.712
Calculated
Corporate
Tax
$2,354,861

38%

Even
40%

Mining

12.495.690

4.519.910

2.079.680

6.599.590

73%

20%

7%

Co— niction

22.223.744

16.288.119

7.215,950

23.504.070

52%

36%

11%

Manufacturing

288.514.301

215.100,251

111.162.795

326.263.046

51%

40%

9%

Transportation

50.709.262

30.443.411

9.651.634

40.095.046

66%

25%

9%

Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade

50.174.092

36.713.264

13.743.347

50.456.611

22%

38%

67.201.264

52.503.273

21.148.548

73.651.821

40%
44%

51%

France. Insurance, and Real
Estate

55.122.385

26,130.085

10.205.405

36.335.490

43%

23%

5%
34%

Services

60.897.755

40.282.818

16.672.171

56.954.990

20%

12%

69%

I'nclassified

19.815.780

10.271.961

3.518.754

13.790.715

1%

1%

HM.0M.Hfl

20%

13%

99%
67%

Grand Total

jw .r a ja

franchise tax based on net worth or assets, which is capped at some maxi
mum payment. In addition, these taxes may have a flat rate or a graduated
rate. This form of taxation has been conventionally justified as a minimum
payment for the privilege of doing business in the state or as a minimum
contribution for the use of services provided by the state, regardless of the
profitability of the corporation. The final form such a tax may take is varied.
One such schedule, which has been suggested by the business community, is
presented in Table 10-26.51 It presents a graduated system of tax payments
starting at $250 for those corporations with net worth (net capital stock plus
additional paid-in capital plus retained earnings) below $10,000; it adds
$500 more in payment for net worth between $10,000 and $50,000, and so
on; and it is capped with a payment of $25,000 for net worth of over $1(X)
million.52 Note that this option would change the minimum tax payment of
the franchise, currently at $50 to $250.
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One important implication of using this form of declining schedule as op
posed to a flat tax rate, for example, is that it tends to be regressive. This is
clear from inspection of Table 10-26. At the mean value of the first bracket
the marginal and average rates represented by the payment for the bracket
are 5 percent. The corresponding payment for the next-to-last bracket rep
resents a marginal rate of 0.04 percent and an average rate of 0.14 percent,
both evaluated at the mean value of the bracket.
Table 10-27 shows the results of a simulation using the schedule shown in
Table 10-26 and assumes the current net worth tax base, apportionment for
mula. The simulations show that revenue from this tax will decrease slightly
from $630 million to $576 million. The losers will be concentrated in the
lower net worth categories. In terms of industry classification, all industries
have a high proportion of losses if this type of tax is imposed.
A different option is simply to reduce the net worth tax base, by defining
the base as made up of net capital stock, paid in capital, and retained earn
ings. Several rate simulations were run on this base. First we set the net
worth tax rate at 0.1 percent. This yielded a loss of tax revenue of approxi
mately $54 million, approximately 6 percent of corporate tax revenue. With
a net worth tax rate of 0.075 percent, revenue loss increased to $89 million,
or for 14 percent of current tax revenues, with a rate of 0.05 percent, rev-

TABLE 10-26
Tax “ Rate” Schedule for the New Net Worth Tax
Proposed by the Private Sector

Net Worth ($)

Tax ($)

0-10,000

250

10,001- 50,000

500

50,001 - 100,000

1,000

100,001 - 250,000

2,500

250,001 - 500,000

5,000

500,001 - 750,000

7,500

750,001 - 1,000,000

10,000

1,000,001 - 10, 000,000

15,000

10,000,001 - 100,000,000

20,000

Over 100,000,000

25,000
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TABLE 10-27
Reforming the Franchise Tax: Replacing Net Worth Tax with
Capped Net Worth Tax, Non-Revenue Neutral Option 4

V t Worth

Base
Corporate Ta*

Less thin I

$35.862.764

. !»cowtTax
$32.484.779

Over 1 • 200.000

32.249.202

22.648.858

200.001 -500.000

25.889.826

17.056.832

500.001 -2.500.000

62.081.815
27.672.764
69.590.881

Reduced Base
Net Worth Ta*

Calculated
CorporateTa*

Winners

$2.369,110

$34,853.889

0%

100%

0%

1.984.243
1.486,114

24.633.101

0%

100%

0%

18.542.946

0%

100%

0%

41.957.122

8.750.593

50.707.715

0%

6.484.011

27.096.350

0«
2 4«

100%

20.612.339

76%

0%

51.720.568
71.945.004

12.673.574

64.394.142

15%

85%

0%

104.136.346

48.808,100

120.753.104

25%

75%

0%

100.000.001 - 250.000.000

62.431.082

43.731,704

25.239.431

68.971,135

16%

84%

0%

250.000.001 - 500.000.000

50.381.815

32.558.519

13.551.377

48,109,895

40%

60%

0%

500.000.001 - 750.000.000

27.084.813

15.493.821

6.771.767

22.265,588

7%

93%

0%

T50,000.001 • 1.000.000,000

11.590.126

6.955.357

5.975.200

12.930.557

44%

56%

0%

121.069.256

76.910.625

6.161.162

83.071.787

30%

70%

0%

$434.075.528

$142.254 682

S576.330.210

7%

93%

0%

Reduced Bate
Net Worth Ta*

Calculated
Corporate Ta*

Winner*

$1,925,119

0%

2.500.001 - 5.000.000
5.000.001 - 20.000.000
; .000 001 - 100.000.000

O ct 1 Billion
<3rind Tool

Bate Corporate
Tax

Economic Sectors

S2.886.417

Agriculture. Forestry and
Fishing

Income Ta*
$1.822.435

$102,685

Losers

Losers

K*en

E»tn

100%

0%
0%

12.495.690

4.519.910

2.205.200

6.725.109

24%

76%

22.223.744

16.288.119

3.138,173

8%

92%

0%

288.514.301

215.100.251
30.443.411

68.865,033
6.383.597

21.426.293
283.965.284

77%

0%

Mirung
1 MNftti

36.827.008

23%
7%

36.713.264

13.783.118

50.496.382

13%

93%
87%

0%

50.174.092
67.201.264

52.503.273

7.704.923

60,208,196

11%

89%

0%

Finance. Insurance, and Real
Estate

55.122.385

26.130,085

17.188,001

43,318,086

20%

80%

0%

Services

60.897.755

40.282.818

16.547.712

56,830.531

3%

97%

0%

Manufacturing

50.709.262

Transportation
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade

0%

Unclassified

19.815.780

10.271.961

4.336.240

14.608.201

0%

100%

0%

Grand Total

S630.Q40.689

S434.075.528

S142.254.682

S576.330.209

7%

93%

0%

enue losses increased to approximately $124 million, or about 20 percent of
current tax revenues, and with a rate of a 0.01 percent, revenue losses
amounted to $182 million, or approximately 28 percent of current revenues.
In all these simulations the majority of taxpayers were not affected, and the
number of winners and losers were of similar magnitude. Losers were con
centrated in mining, construction, manufacturing and transportation, while
winners were concentrated in wholesale and retail trade.

Other R

eform

Coverage.

O

p t io n s

The corporate franchise tax at present gives special treatment
to corporations that are financial depositary institutions and exempts cor
porations in other sectors, most importantly public utilities, telecommunica
tions companies, and insurance companies, which are subject to special
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taxation regimes. Although at some point there may have been justification
for the special tax regimes, such as the existence of monopoly power, or dif
ficulties in administering and enforcing a franchise tax in these sectors, most
of these reasons have now largely or completely disappeared. An important
option for reform of the franchise tax is to make its coverage universal to all
business corporations. There should not be any major difficulty in doing this,
as long as those corporations thrown back into the general regime are sub
ject to the federal corporate income tax. This universal coverage option
under the corporate franchise tax does not preclude special taxation
regimes, of course, because of the difficulty in applying sales taxes to finan
cial institutions and insurance companies, and the desirability of excise tax
ation of some utility services.
Several options for reform should be considered
in the apportionment formulas of the franchise tax. First we examine the op
tions with respect to the apportionment formula for the net income tax.
Next, we discuss options for the apportionment formula for the net worth
tax, if this tax is to be kept in some form.
During the past decade,
we have seen many states, including Ohio, that have used modified appor
tionment formulas. The most common modification has been the switch to
a double-weighted sales factor in the traditional three-factor formula. The
latter is the apportionment formula used for the net income tax component
in O h io ’s franchise tax. Several states have adopted formulas that give the
sales factor an even larger weight, including the use of the sales ratio as the
only factor in the formula.
The fundamental reason for adopting formulas giving more weight to the
sales factor is to decrease the tax burden of companies with property and
payroll in the state and increase it for out-of-state companies selling (but not
producing) commodities within the state. The longer term goal o f this pol
icy is to encourage the location of businesses in the state.
The issue is whether the State of Ohio should consider a single-factor
sales formula for the net income tax. The answer may be yes if the objective
is to let O hio become more competitive in attracting business locations visa-vis other states that already have adopted modified apportionment for
mulas. This statement does not assume that changes in the apportionment
formula and therefore in state franchise taxes are decisive in affecting busi
ness location. However, this is an issue on which there is no convincing em
pirical evidence one way or another.53 It should also be understood that the
competitive margin granted by modifications in the formula would be erased
as soon as other states introduced similar modifications in the apportion
ment formula.
To explore the impact of switching to a single sales factor for the net in
come tax in Ohio, we ran a simulation isolating this factor from any other
changes. The results are presented in Table 10-28. The move would have

Apportionment formulas.

Heavier weight to sales in the net income formula?
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TABLE 10-28
Simulation Results of Moving to a Single Sales Factor
for the Net Income Tax
Base
v i Worth 1$)
Less than 1

___ £.o.r.Eora_te T»x
$35,862,764

New
Corporate Tax
$34,735,433

Winner*

Losers

Even

0.6%

0.4%

99 0%

Over 1 - 200.000

32,249,202

2,222,534

1.4%

0.0%

98 6%

100.001 - 500.000

25,889,826

2.118,991

20.2%

1.5%

78 3%

500.001 - 2.500.000

62,081,815

21.540,353

31.4%

8.0%

:.500.001 - 5.000.000

27.672,764

19,932.529

66 1%

6 8%

60 6%
27 1%

69,590,881

45,915,902

57.1%

13.1%

29 8%

104,136,346

129,760.020

9.3%

12.1%

78 5%

».000.001 - 250.000.000

62,431,082

73,473.463

60%

180%

.'50.000.001 - 500.000.000

50,381,815

60.251,007

4.1%

12.4%

75 9%
83 4%

500.000. 001 • 750.000.000

27,084.813

44.797,523

2.0%

42 8%

55 2%

11,590,126

23,341,017

00%

31.0%

69 0%

121.069,256

150,329,233

3.7%

54 0%

42 3%

62%

5.1%

88 7%

$.000,001 ■20.000.000
; 000.001 • 100.000.000

750.000,001 • 1.000.000,000
Over 1 Billion
Grand Total

honomtc Sectors

Base
( nrp.r-.tr lax

New
Corporate Tax

Winners

Losers

Even

\griculture. Forestry, and Fishing

$2,886,417

$1,440,781

400%

20.0%

400%

Mining

12.495.690

12.511.913

14.7%

6 2%

79.1%
67 7%

Co-inruction

22.223.744

20.509.373

188%

Manufacturing

288.514,301

335.171.073

18.6%

13.5%
17.7%

T'importation

50.709.262

34,939,703

13.1%

6.4%

80 5%

Wholesale Trade

50.174.092

45,808.991

11.1%

63%

82 6%

Rruil Trade

67,201,264

52,729,962

30.3%

118%

57 9%

r nance. Insurance, and Real Estate

55.122.385

40.172,667

10.4%

3.3%

86 3%

Services

60,897.755

53.749,529

3.9%

65%

89 6%

Inclassified

19.815,780

11,384,010

0.2%

0.1%

99 7%

6.2%

5 1%

88 7%

GrandTottl

M W .1

63 8%

produced a decrease in franchise revenues in 1993 of approximately $21.6
million, or a 3.4 percent decrease in revenues. This change is small enough
to be associated simply with the sampling error in the simulation. Notice,
however, that these results represent static changes for that particular year.
That is, the results do not include any potential gains in revenues that may
be realized from additional corporations moving production activities to
Ohio. The distribution of winners tends to favor middle sized firms (in net
worth), which are more likely to have payroll and property used in produc
tion in Ohio. The losers tend to be larger-size firms, which have relatively
more sales than labor and property used in production in the state. Most of
the small firms which tend to be 100 percent Ohio operations, with an ap
portionment ratio of 100, are not affected by the change. The distribution of
winners and losers by economic sector is more even. Every sector has more
winners than losers except for the service sector. On the whole, 88.7 percent
of the companies are not affected, but that is mostly because of the much
larger number of companies that are all Ohio companies.
Are there any significant arguments against the change in the apportion
ment formula? One consideration is the fact that by adopting a single sales
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factor O h io w ould move state corporate taxation still fu rther from a uniform
ap p o rtio n m e n t system such as th e one p redicated in U D ITPA .54 The lack of
a uniform system creates the possibility of over-apportionm ent of corpora
tion incom es am ong those states with a co rp o rate income tax.55 Those com
p anies m o re adversely affected by the possible change in the apportionment
form ula, large corporatio n s with extensive sales in O hio and relatively small
p rodu ctio n facilities, will likely p u t up a strong cam paign calling the move
unfair.
A priori th ere is no overw helm ing reason to use one form ula over another
in ap p o rtio n in g incom e. Justifications of any of the form ulas can be made
ex-post, each o n e b e tte r capturing the underlying causes o f the tax base. In
reality, the m ultiplicity of form ulas and appo rtio nm ent schemes used in
o th e r states puts O hio, as any o th e r state, in the position of having to care
only ab o u t w hat form ula will maximize revenue over the long run. It is im
p o rta n t to em phasize again th a t the revenue perspective must be a long
term perspective, because th e tax base in the state may increase or decrease
as m ore com panies locate in o r outside O hio in response to the formula
adopted . R evenues in the long run will also be affected by the apportion
m en t form ulas ad o p ted by o th e r states. U nfortunately, there is no evidence
on how im p o rtan t any o f these effects may be on a state by state basis.
Reforming the apportionment formula for the net worth tax. If the net worth
tax w ere to be k ept eith er in its cu rren t form o r as a new modified net worth
tax excluding reserves and d eferred taxes from the base, there are several
possibilities for changing the ap portionm ent form ula for either tax. The cur
re n t two facto r form ula could be substituted with the three-factor double
w eighted form ula used in th e n et income tax. This w ould have the effect of
shifting the b u rd en o f the n et w orth tax tow ard out o f state companies. This
w ould be so because o f the double weighting of sales and because of the ex
clusion o f intangible incom e and assets from the com putation of the sales
and pro p erty factors, respectively. The a priori expectations o f the impact of
this change is th at m ost w inners would be concentrated am ong small and
m iddle-sized com panies, which w ould tend to be O hio com panies, and most
losers w ould be concen trated am ong larger size com panies, which would
ten d to include m ore non-O hio com panies.
A second possibility would be to apportion the net w orth base with a twofactor form ula based on sales and property, as com puted now for the net in
com e tax. T his change should still lighten the tax burden o f O hio companies
co m p ared to o u t-of-state com panies, but quite probably less than by using
th e double-w eighted sales th ree factor form ula of the net income tax. A
third possibility w ould be to use a single-factor form ula, with the choice
being betw een th e property facto r and the sales factor.
Use o f the throwback rule. O h io could jo in o th e r states in introducing a
throw back rule in the com pu tatio n o f the sales factor in the app o rtio n m ent
form ula for net incom e taxes. O f course, this would help increase revenues
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from the franchise tax, b u t in m inor am ounts. W hat the rule would do is ap
portion corporate incom e to the State of Ohio that otherwise might not be
apportioned anyw here else. However, given the many differences in appor
tionment form ulas across states under which multistate corporations have to
file, the introduction of a throwback rule would tend to destroy the little
cushion corporations may have to avoid the over-apportionm ent and, th ere
fore, double taxation o f their incomes.
Raise the minimum payment o f the franchise tax. Regardless of what is
done in o th er areas o f th e franchise tax, there is the option to increase the
minimum paym ent u n d er the franchise tax from its current $50 level. The
current $50 may be too low to cover the expense to the Tax D epartm ent of
processing a tax return. T he increase in the minimum payment can be made
part of a new n et w orth tax, as we have seen above. Table 10-29 shows the
potential im pact on revenues o f raising the minimum payment by $50 steps
from the cu rren t level o f $50 to $500. At the present level of $50 the mini
mum tax raises $2.2 million, representing 0.36 percent of corporate fran
chise tax revenues. W ith a m inimum tax o f $500, revenues raised would have
been $22.4 million, o r 3.56 percent o f corporate franchise tax revenues.
These calculations are perform ed on th e basis of the num ber of corpora
tions that should have paid the minim um tax in 1993.
Tax rates. O hio already has one of the highest corporate income tax rates,
as discussed in Section 2. Still the possibility is there to increase tax rates. An
increase of 1 p ercen t in the top rate for net incomes above $50,000 would
have generated betw een $40 million and $50 million in additional tax rev
enues in 1993.

TABLE 10-29
Effect on Tax Revenue of Increasing
th e M inim um C orporate Tax

Minimum Tax A m ount

A m ount of Revenue
G enerated

Percent of Total Current Tax
Revenue

550

S2.242.750

0.3560

S100

S4.485.500

0.7119

S150

S6.728.250

1.0679

5200

$8,971,000

1.4239

5250

$11,213,750

1.7798

5300

$13,456,500

2.1358

5350

$15,699,250

2.4918

5400

$17,942,000

2.8477

5450

$20,184,750

3.2037

5500

$22,427,500

3.5597
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O th e r possibilities for reform in the rate structure include changing the
net incom e thresh o ld of $50,000 for the curren t lower rate o f 5.1 percent,
changing the low er rate itself, and introducing one or m ore additional brack
ets. Several states, including Iowa, Kentucky, and M issouri, have graduated
progressive ra te schedules. T he advantage o f the present system, with a
low er rate for relatively small levels o f income, is th a t it does offer some ad
vantage to sm all businesses w ith o u t sacrificing a large sum in revenues and
w ithou t giving strong incentives for the breakup of larger companies into
sm aller units. T his is a com m on criticism of progressive rate schedules for
co rp o ra te incom e taxes. However, there is little em pirical evidence on how
im p o rtan t these effects may be in reality.
Credits and other tax benefits. T h e re are, as we saw in Section 1, many tax
credits and o th e r tax benefits th a t underm ine the revenue-raising capacity of
the franchise tax at th e present tim e. Some o f the credits appear to be justi
fied, in o rd e r to avoid the double taxation o f assets. But most of the credits
have been intro d u ced in the spirit o f the necessity of special treatm ent to en
courag e certain activities. T h ere is no general consensus among economists
a b o u t the desirability and effectiveness of these incentives; the experience of
d ifferen t tax system s with a variety o f tax benefits is th at many of these in
terventio n s d o n o t seem to p roduce the desired objectives, and sometimes
they m ay actually be harm ful because of the m isallocation of resources they
induce.
T h e reform o f the corporate franchise tax is clearly an opportunity to re
view and simplify th e system o f credits and tax incentives u n der the franchise
tax. If the franchise tax is sim plified with the elim ination o f the net worth
com po n en t, th ere will be room to fu rth er simplify the system of tax benefits
and tax incentives.
M ake all allocable income apportionable. As we have seen, Ohio allocates
certain types o f incom e, mostly from intangible assets, regardless of whether
th ese incom es have a business o r non-business source. Some states also al
locate to the state non-business incom e. Yet som e o th er states make no dis
tinction betw een business and non-business incom e and make all types of
incom e ap p o rtio n ab le, as o p posed to allocable.
O n e option for reform in O hio is to m ake all types o f income apportion
able. T his possibility is sim ulated in Table 10-30. This change would have
b een a mild revenue w inner in 1993, raising $23.5 m illion in additional tax
revenues. A gain in this case, all-O hio com panies (small and middle- size)
te n d to be relative w inners since all their incom es that before were 100 per
cen t allocable are now app o rtio n ab le at less than 100 percent, if the corpo
ratio n has business outside O hio. T he relative losers tend to be larger
n o n-O h io com panies which b efo re could exclude allowable income not sitused to O hio, b u t now would have to include all those incomes as appor
tionable. T h e distribution o f w inners and losers by econom ic sector shows
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T A B L E 10-30

C orporation Tax without Using Schedule C (Allocable Income)
in Com puting Taxable Income

V t Worth ($)
Less than 1
O m 1 200.000
:oo.ooi - 500.000
500.001 - 2.500.000
500.001 - 5.000.000
SDO.OOO.OOl - 20.000.000
:o ooo.ooi • loo.ooo.ooo
100.000.001 • 250.000.000
250.000,001 • 500.000.000
500,000,001 • 750.000.000
*50.000.001 • 1.000.000.000
Over 1 Billion
Grand Tottl

Economic Sector?
At' culture. Forestry, and
Fishing
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation
Whc c alc Trade
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, and Real
Estate
Service*
Unclassified
Grand Tottl

Base
C orporate Tax
$35,862,764
32.249.202
25.889.826
62,081.815
27.672.764
69.590,881
104,136,346
62.431.082
50.381.815
27.084.813
11.590.126
121.069.256

xxmm
Base
C orporate Tax
$2,886,417
12.495.690
22.223,744

New
Corporate Tax
$34,427,439
2.504.658
2.268.087
22.980.754
22.903.800
57.024.704
157.289.230
78.633.555
67.935.855
49.018.931
24.047.070
134.523.081

New
C orporate Tax
$1,249,378

55.122.385

12,029.018
18.732,813
360.418.276
38.412,253
46.687.465
55.493.993
46.137.737

60.897.755
19.815.780

62.216.255
12.179.976

288.514.301
50.709.262
50,174.092
67.201.264

tt33.tt7.lM

W inner,
0«
5%
42«
49«
34«
40«
31«
26«
21«
39«
17«
54«

Loser,
3«
1«
19«
15«
5«
16«
53 «
37«
76«
56«

Even
97«
94«
39«
35«
61«
44«
16«
37«

12«

15«

3«
6«
0«
2«
73«

Winners
10«

leasers
0«

Even
90«

44«

27«
34«

29«
47«
27«
50«
22«
50 «
39«
8«
0«
12«

83«
44«

20«
44«
14«
2 3«
19«
4 3«
14«
3«
15«

28«
35 «
55«
31«
18«
78«
97«
73«

the same result. T hose sectors th at are m ore likely to have O hio companies
(e.g., construction an d retail trad e) tend to be winners.
Should Ohio require combined income reporting for unitary businesses? The
advantages of m andating com bined income reporting for unitary businesses
are many. Fundam entally, com bined income reporting elim inates artificial
discrepancies in the tax base through accounting and arbitrary allocations of
revenues and expenses across state boundaries.
However, com bined income reporting is still controversial as an appor
tionment m ethod. Critics have argued that com bined income reporting is
contrary to the a rm ’s-length standard and to the formulary apportionm ent
of a single taxpayer’s incom e. T he co u n ter answer from proponents of com 
bined income rep o rtin g is that the arm ’s-length standard and single taxpayer
formulary ap p o rtio n m en t have becom e fictions in a world w here unitary
businesses have at th e ir disposal a variety of avenues to artificially reduce
their state tax liabilities.
Combined incom e reporting is not a panacea, either. M andating it will re-
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quire a very clear set o f regulations in com plex areas. Com bined reporting
should be distinguished from consolidated return filing. The following para
graphs describe som e of these distinctions, and briefly review the scope of
issues th at w ould have to be decided if m andatory com bined income report
ing w ere adopted.
C om b in ed reporting is an approach for determ ining the income attribut
able to a state from each of the corporations that are m em bers of an affili
ated g ro u p o f com panies conducting a unitary business in several states.56
W hen th ere is m ore than one co rporation in the affiliated group doing busi
ness in th e state, th e unitary incom e apportioned to the state is in turn ap
p o rtio n e d am ong th e different com panies with nexus in the state.57
D epen d in g on the type o f com bined reporting, not all affiliated corporations
in a gro u p may be com bined. C om bination applies to a “unitary business,”
and the d eterm in atio n o f w hat this is can vary.
It is im p o rtan t to distinguish betw een the filing of “com bined income re
p o rts” and th e filing o f “consolidated retu rn s.” T hese two term s are at times
used interchangeably, but they are quite different things. T he objective of
com bined incom e reporting is not to tax the income of the affiliated group
as a w hole o r the filing o f a consolidated return. R ather, the objective is to
determ in e th e portion of the incom e from the unitary business attributable
to the com panies with nexus or operations in the state. T he combined in
com e re p o rt is an inform ation retu rn rath er than a tax return. Each corpo
ration in a com bined rep o rt with nexus in the state still has to file its own
co rp o ra te tax return. See Box 10-2 for the steps followed in combined in
com e reporting.
By co n trast, in a consolidated retu rn the total net incom e of the corpora
tions in the group is filed in a single return and a single tax is paid (even
though each of the corporations is jointly and severally liable for payment).
In the case o f consolidated retu rn s, net incom e is not lim ited to that related
to a specific unitary business. O f course, when the consolidated business op
e rates in m o re than one state, app o rtio n m en t will be necessary in the con
solidated retu rn . See Box 10-2.
Two im p o rtan t decisions would have to be m ade if the State of Ohio were
to req u ire com bined incom e reporting for all unitary businesses. These con
cern th e “basis,” o r how far and wide the com bination should go, and the
“sta n d a rd s,” o r how to d eterm ine which corporations should file a combined
rep o rt.58
T h e choices for basis are essentially three, although som e combinations
o f these th ree are also possible: worldwide com bination, which includes all
dom estic and foreign incom e; dom estic or w ater’s edge com bination, which
includes only U nited States source incom e; and a nexus combination which
includes only com panies with nexus in the state, o r corporations domiciled
in the state, o r som e com bination thereof.
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BOX 10-2
S tate’s A pportionm ent in Com bined Income Reports*
U nder a com bined income approach the share of income of the
unitary business th at is taxable in the state is determ ined as fol
lows:
First, define the scope of the unitary business and what corpora
tions should be m ade part of the com bined report.
Second, d eterm ine the net incom e derived by the unitary busi
ness inside and outside the state, eliminating all income and
expenses attrib u tab le to internal transactions within the unitary
group itself.
Third, determ ine the share of the unitary group’s income that is
allocable to the state and then determ ine the part of the unitary
business incom e th at is apportioned to the state, and apply the
statutory form ula for apportioning the unitary business income
(not directly allocable).
Fourth, divide th e total net taxable income of the unitary business
attributable to th e state am ong the corporations of the group that
have nexus w ithin th e state according to the distribution among
them of the factors used in the apportionm ent formula.
‘ A d ap ted from Jo h n L. Coalson, Jr. an d M ichael T. Plrik, “C onsolidated or
C om b in ed R e tu rn s a n d A lternative C o rp o rate R eporting M ethods: A G eorgia
P erspective,” Jo u rn al o f S tate Taxation, Vol. 8, No.2, Fall 1989, pp. 132-151.

The standards used to determ ine when a group of affiliated com panies
actually constitutes a unitary business vary. The most common standard is
based on the “th ree u n ities” of com m on ownership, com m on m anagem ent,
and common o p eratio n o r use. C om m on ownership is typically interpreted
to exist when 50 percent o r m ore of the stock of a corporation is owned by
another corporation. C om m on m anagem ent is typically interpreted to exist
when there are overlapping boards o f directors or com m on managers in key
positions. Com m on o p eratio n is in terp reted to exist when there are common
functions of m anagem ent, financing, accounting, advertising, or purchasing.
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O th e r stan d ard s used rely on the existence of dependency or contribu
tions betw een affiliated corporations, sim ilarities in the line o f business, or
significant in terco rp o rate transactions.
N et operating losses. The state could introduce a carry back provision for
N O LS, to be m ore com petitive. However, the present provision of no cany
back allow ed does not put O hio at a disadvantage with neighboring states
and avoids som e of the revenue instability associated with the carry back
provision.
Joining the Multistate Tax Com pact? Joining the M ultistate Tax Compact
and subscribing to U D ITPA (T he U niform Division o f Income for Tax
P urposes A ct) w ould require som e im portant changes in the O hio corporate
franchise tax, m ost im portantly in the ap portionm ent form ula. There would
be the advantage o f adding clarity and standardized procedures. The state
tax adm in istratio n also would benefit from the m ultistate audits and inter
pretive rulings d one by the Tax C om pact for specific business sectors.
H ow ever, joining U D ITPA may be unfavorably regarded in the business
com m unity.
The reform o f local income taxes. T here is am ple room for standardization
and sim plification of these taxes. Ideally, at the very least, all local jurisdic
tions w ould ad o p t the sam e basic tax structure and procedures, although
they w ould be able to vary the rates. Some d egree o f discretion in the abil
ity to raise revenues is desirable, to increase efficiency and accountability in
local governm ents.59 U n d er this approach each business would still have to
file a tax retu rn in each o f the jurisdictions w here it operates. An even more
sim plified ap proach would be to rely on centralized filing with the State
D e p artm e n t o f Taxation and to devise a system for the apportionm ent of
collections am ong local jurisdictions. This approach would significantly re
duce com pliance costs for businesses, and in theory it could be structured to
allow d ifferen tiated rates for local jurisdictions.

E l im in a t io n o f t h e F r a n c h is e T a x
T he last o p tio n to consider is th e com plete elim ination of the corporate
fran ch ise tax. F our states (N evada, South D akota, Washington, and
W yom ing) have at present no co rp o rate incom e tax.60 T he substitution of
c o rp o ra te incom e tax revenues w ith existing taxes, such as the personal in
com e tax o r th e sales tax, is quite feasible. T he corporate income t a x yielded
$630 m illion in 1993. This revenue could have been collected from the per
sonal incom e tax by eith er o f two changes: 1) getting rid o f the following
credits an d incom e exclusions: social security and railroad retirem ent exclu
sions, perso n al exem ption credits, senior citizen credits, joint filer credits,
and retire m e n t incom e credits (all m ajor credits and adjustm ents on the in
dividual incom e tax); o r 2) by a 0.5 percent surcharge on taxable income (ef
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fectively in crea sin g all rates by 0 .5 p ercen t). T h e elim in ation o f the c o r p o 
rate in co m e tax w o u ld crea te a m ore attractive business clim ate. State c o r 
porate in c o m e ta x es, in clu d in g th e co rp o ra te franchise tax in O h io ,
represent d o u b le ta x a tio n o f co rp o ra te in co m e b ecau se o f their lack o f in te 
gration w ith th e p e rso n a l in co m e tax. T h is d ou b le taxation is im posed on top
of the d o u b le taxation o f co rp o ra te in co m e at the federal level w here there
is no in teg ra tio n o f th e tw o taxes eith er. A n additional attraction o f c o m 
pletely elim in a tin g th e co rp o ra te in c o m e tax is that the state w ould not have
to co n tin u e to rely o n an u n stab le and probably d eclin in g sou rce o f rev
enues. T h e m ain d isa d v a n ta g e o f e lim in a tin g the corp orate franchise tax is
that there w o u ld b e a shift o f tax b u rd en s now borne by n o n resid en ts (as
owners o f cap ital an d c o n su m er s) to sta te residents. A lth ou gh a p ortion o f
the franchise tax is su rely exp o rted , that m ay not b e the ca se w ith substitute
taxes such as th e p e r so n a l in co m e tax or the sales tax.

A PPE N D IX
TA X R E T U R N SA M P L E DATA U SE D
IN T H E M IC R O -S IM U L A T IO N S
Sampling was performed on the basis o f a master file o f taxpayers from the Ohio
Department o f Taxation. This file had information coded from the first page o f the
corporate return. In total there were approximately 107,000 taxpayers. Most o f the
information needed to construct the tax calculator was not available from the tax re
turn’s first page. This necessitated the drawing of a sample of fully filled-out tax re
turns. The sam ple originally designed contained the complete set o f the largest 500
companies in terms o f tax liability. We added to them a random sample o f just over
1 percent o f the remaining firms that accounted for an additional 1,000 firms. A
small number o f firms with no taxable incom e but “large” net worth tax liability was
also included to make sure that firms were represented.
After the coding o f entire data, som e tax returns were not usable due to taxpayer
errors and omissions. In addition, some tax returns were not available because they
were in the audit process. The final sample contained 1377 firms representing 44.2
percent o f the total franchise tax revenues collected by the state. The results from
this sample were “blown-up” to the entire set o f taxpayers. Because we used three
different samples (a full sample of the largest companies, a full sample of zero or low
profit but high net worth firms, and a random sample o f the remaining firms), dif
ferent “blown up” factors were used so that the revenue contribution for each sam
ple matched the population from which it was drawn. The sample returns after being
“blown-up” replicated 99 percent o f the actual revenue collected in 1993. The tax
calculator built replicated the corporate income tax forms. The calculator was used
to develop the base core analysis and was modified to develop the simulation results.
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ENDNOTES
1. T he authors would like to thank the O hio Department o f Taxation for the effort
o f collecting the sample return data used in the simulation o f the corporate fran
chise tax in this chapter and for general information and guidance. We would also
like to thank Wen Tsui and Joe Timmerman for their valuable research assistance.
We w ould also like to thank the Tax Com m ittee o f the Ohio Chamber o f Commerce
for information and insights in the various corporate income tax issues covered in
this chapter.
2. “D oin g business” in the state is evidenced by a number o f activities, such as listing
the company in the phone book or the licensing o f software. O hio takes one of the
most aggressive stands in determining nexus. Som e o f these are reviewed below in
the com parison o f O hio franchise tax with that in other states.
3. Since 1993 railroad companies no longer pay the public utility excise tax and are
instead subject to the regular franchise tax.
4. O ther corporations exem pted from the franchise tax are nonprofit corporations
(except for som e consum er and agricultural cooperatives), municipal corporations,
credit unions, real estate investment trusts, regulated investment companies, and
real estate mortgage investment conduits (ORC 1733.43, 5733.01, 5733.09, and
5733.10).
5. States are not allowed to tax interest from federal obligations if they exempt in
terest incom e from state public obligations.
6. See the D epartm ent o f Taxation’s Annual Report 1992, page 21, for recent signif
icant court decisions involving the issue o f allocable versus apportionable income.
7. D ividends are allocated to the state according to the “Ohio-to-be-everywhere"
ratio for the book value o f assets o f the payor company. Dividends from Domestic
International Sales Corporations and from corporations for which there is no infor
mation on the location o f assets are apportioned.
8. Trademark royalties are not considered patent or copyright royalties, and they are
treated as apportionable income.
9. Prior to 1982 the carry forward period was five consecutive years.
10. T he gross profit portion o f incom e received but not yet earned is includable in
the value o f the stock, as are net deferred tax liabilities. Contingent liabilities are in
cluded in the com putation of net worth if the corporation cannot reasonably esti
mate the amount o f the liability or if it cannot be established that the liability is to be
incurred in the current period.
11. Intangible assets are not part o f goodwill if they can be sold and purchased sep
arately with an identifiable value.
12. This tax offers a mild incentive for filing a combined franchise report. The entire
group o f corporations pay only the two tier litter tax once as a group rather than in
dividually by each corporation.
13. For a more detailed analysis o f the effects o f credits, or econom ic d e v e lo p m e n t
in O hio, see Michael Wasylenko, “The Role o f Fiscal Incentives in Economic
D evelopm ent: How O hio Stands Relative to its Competitor States,” Chapter 9 in this
volum e.
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14 The Am ended Substitute Bill 32 extended the credit for qualifying new invest
ments with respect to property acquired before 1989. This Bill also created a re
fundable credit, while the original new investment credit is a non-refundablc credit.
15. The conditions are regulated in O hio Revised Code Section 5733.052 and Tkx
Commissioner’s Rule 5703-5-06.
16. Each o f the corporations combining incomes must have income other than divi
dend income within Ohio.
17. Corporations without business nexus in Ohio may be included in a combined in
come report with approval o f the Commissioner. However, these corporations must
derive income in the sam e fashion as the taxpayer corporations.
18. In a recent case the O hio Board of Tax Appeals held that corporations filing com 
bined franchise tax reports for prior years may not add retroactively another corpo
ration to the com bined group without consent o f the Commissioner. The
Commissioner had withheld consent, arguing that the subsidiary which was trying to
add to the combined group had no income allocable or apportionable to the state o f
Ohio (The Tranzonic Companies and Subsidiaries w. Tracy, Ohio Board o f Tax
Appeals, D ecem ber 4 ,1 9 9 2 ).
19. ACIR (1993).
20. The representative tax system is defined by the ACIR at the average state cor
porate income tax rate times the national corporate profits apportioned to the state
according to a three factor (sales, property and employment) formula.
21. Note that Figure 1-9 uses two scales, in millions for Ohio and in billions for all
states.
22. However, S corporations do face a number of restrictions which do not affect C
corporations. S corporations cannot have more than 35 shareholders, they can issue
only one type o f stock, they must be domestic corporations, and they may not be part
of an affiliated group.
23. See Robert Carrol and David Joulfaian (1993).
24. See Alan J. Auerbach and James Poterba (1993).
25. From an average o f 10.9 percent in the 1960s the profit rate fell to 7.2 percent
during the 1970s and 4.9 percent during the first half o f the 1980s.
26. The Supreme Court has ruled that the taking o f sales orders by a traveling sales
man does not constitute nexus when those orders are filled and delivery is made from
a location outside o f the state. However, a permanent employee in the state for sales
activities may be outside the spirit o f the Supreme Court ruling.
27. For the rationale behind different formulas, see Peggy B. Musgrave (1994b).
28. Approval o f the Tax Commissioner is required.
29. These deductions are related to the domestic corporation dividends subject to
the 70 percent deduction.
30. O f course, the federal government im poses an alternative minimum tax but this
falls on income (at 20 percent on the regular net income base grossed up for tax pref
erences) rather than assets.
31. Besides Pennsylvania, other states with significant net worth taxes are Alabama,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.
32. See A. Estache (1990).
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33. See Peter D. Byrne (1994).
34. Business taxes on assets are actually used as a method o f presumptive income tax
ation based on the idea that capital assets will produce som e minimum rate of return
on average or otherwise the enterprise would get out o f the business.
35. A llow ing the asset tax to be carried forward as a credit still does not solve the
major problem discussed below that the tax imposes a burden when the firm can
least afford it. Actually, the credit provides relief when the firm is in a better posi
tion and may not need the relief as much.
36. Som e countries with taxes on gross or net assets have addressed this problem by
exem pting newly formed companies for several years. O hio does not have a similar
provision regarding the net worth tax.
37. The credit, it is argued, also may have served as a check on property ta x increases
at the local level, since increases in property taxes meant decreases in s ta te taxes.
H owever, it may have worked the other way around. With the credit in place local ju
risdictions may have had an incentive to increase property taxes, since the credit it
was the state and not the companies that actually had to pay the tax (for as long, of
course, as the com panies were paying the net worth tax com ponent of the franchise
tax rather than the net incom e com ponent).
38. The situsing rules are for the most part those in the statutes o f the intangible
property tax, which was repealed in 1986. In terms of complexity, business represen
tatives often referred to the instructions for situsing, investment in subsidiaries,
which is 25 pages long.

39. The marginal effective rates o f taxation are calculated by assuming identical pre
tax rates o f return for different assets and econom ic sectors and calculating an after
tax rules o f return for each type o f investment after all aspects o f taxation affecting
those investm ents are taken into consideration.
40. See Charles E. M cLure, Jr. (1986). Peter Mieszkowski and John Morgan (1984).
41. The only receipts excluded from the business done factor are management fees
for services by a parent company for a subsidiary without a profit element, and the
proceeds from the sale o f som e assets.
42. See Charles E. M cLure, Jr. (1984); G eorge N. Carlson and Harvey Galper (1984)
and A licia H. Munnell (1992).
43. Section 162 o f the 1991 Budget Bill.
44. S ee Jeffrey P. Sherman (1991).
45. S ee the 1994 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide.
46. The U D IT PA (U niform Distribution o f Income for Tax Purposes Act) approach
is to allocate only non-business income. This latter is defined as originating in assets
not in use for daily business activities.
47. The O hio Board o f Tax Appeals has ruled that the “aggregate” or ( c o n d u it) prin
ciple applies to the com putation o f the franchise tax. This means that all in c o m e and
deductions realized by a partnership are transplanted as such to the c o r p o r a te part
ner for the calculation o f its franchise tax.
48. For exam ple, businesses with distribution services am ong different local govern
ments in theory need to keep track o f how long a truck and driver spends in each ju
risdiction in the course o f a day.
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49. We are grateful to the Department of Taxation for making the data available. The
sample of tax returns and the micro-simulation methodology are described in the
Appendix.
50. Of course, this principle should not apply only to incorporated businesses but
rather to all types of legal forms of enterprises.
51 The proposals from the business community with respect to the repeal of the net
worth tax have not been necessarily consistent in the sense that they factor both the
proposition of revenue neutrality and a reformed net worth tax with a cap and other
features (e.g. lower rates) which may make revenue neutrality impossible.
52. The proposal from the business community also suggests that the maximum cap in
the schedule should be used for a combined group. However, the rationale of the tax
as a minimum payment for services or the privilege to do business in the state suggests
that each corporation in a combined group should pay this type of tax separately.
53. See M. Wasylenko, “The Role of Fiscal Incentives in Economic Development:
How Ohio Stands Relative to Its Competitor States,” Chapter 9 in this volume.
54. UDITPA adopts the three factors formula with equal weights for sales, payroll
and property.
55. However, nationwide there does not appear to be significant over apportion
ment. See Steven M. Sheffin and Jack Fulcher (1984).
56. See for example, James F. Buresh and Marc S. Weinstein (1982).
57. Often the second-stage apportionment is not done with the entire income ap
portioned to the state assessed to the “key corporation” of the group in the state.
58. Several administrative issues would also need to be addressed, involving rules for
the consolidation of intercompany transactions, the merging of different accounting
periods, how to address partnerships in the affiliated group, how to deal with foreign
source income, and whether there should be some modification of the apportion
ment formula to recognize the different nature of some of the corporations, such as
financial institutions and insurance companies.
59. By efficiency what is meant is that the residents of some jurisdictions may have
higher preferences for public services, and the system of local finances should let
these jurisdictions fulfill these preferences on a voluntary basis.
60. Michigan does not have a corporate income tax, but it has a “single business tax,”
which is a modified value-added tax (VAT).

